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THE
DIPLOMATIC YEAR:

BEING A
REVIEW OF MR. SEWARD'S

Foreign Correspondence of 1862.

BY

A NORTHERN MAN.

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Second Edition, with a Postscript.



PHILADELPHIA:
JOHN CAMPBELL, PUBLISHER,
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1863:

THE DIPLOMATIC YEAR.

MR. SEWARD has thrown down another challenge to the world. He has issued a volume—rather more than twice as thick as the one he printed a year ago—containing his annual correspondence with all the nations of the earth. He invites criticism—or he sets it at defiance; and in neither case, can he or his admirers, (of whom he no doubt has some,) complain, if it be fair and manly. Such is the aim of the following pages—the writer at the outset pledging himself to demonstrate, that Mr. Seward's pretensions to scholarship, to statesmanship, or to enlightened patriotism in dealing with the foreign, or, so far as he has had to do with them, the domestic relations of our afflicted country, are utterly without foundation.

One disclaimer the author of these pages thinks it due to himself to make. In this, or any other adverse criticism, he is conscious of no motive of private resentment—no sense of personal wrong. At the same time, he cannot disguise from those who take the trouble to read what he writes, that, viewing Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of State as the author and willing abettor of the systematic outrages on the liberty of the citizen—on the freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press—which have deformed the government and disgraced the people (inasmuch as they submitted to them)—so regarding him, the author would be recreant to the principles of freedom in which he has been nurtured—faithless to the profession to which he is proud to belong, but which Mr. Seward, (himself a lawyer,) has insulted,

if he sought to repress the sentiment of indignation at the manifold wrongs that have been done—or the less elevated feeling, which literary and political imposture always ought to inspire.

It was Mr. Seward who initiated the system of arbitrary arrests, and who has made, so far as in him lay, the names of Lafayette, and Warren, and McHenry, infamous. It was he who caused at least one person to be arrested, and when he bought his way out of gaol by a discreet application of money—the possession of which, in Bank of England notes, was his imputed crime—treated the arrest and the prisoner's suffering with a coarse jocularly at which Mr. Lincoln's kind feeling revolted, though jocularly rarely comes amiss to him. It was Mr. Seward who, without authority, even from his chief, and as is generally understood from private pique, dating as far back as the formation of the cabinet, imprisoned the Mayor of Washington, and was forced to release him by Mr. Lincoln's peremptory order. It was he who immured in a series of Bastiles the Maryland gentlemen—men of refinement, cultivation and unblemished character—relying, in the case of one of them, on a document, which proved to be a forgery, as evidence of guilt. He continued to hold his post in the cabinet after the bloodiest of outrages—for such it literally was—had been committed under its authority, in the arrest of Judge Carmichael, who was beaten and dragged by soldiers from the bench to prison. It was Mr. Seward who, while he kept his innocent countrymen, his own immediate fellow-citizens, in prison, discharged Gilchrist, the Englishman, who had been held by judicial warrant and remanded after a full hearing before a judge. It was Mr. Seward who applauded the Provost-Marshal at Washington for resisting a *habeas corpus* for a minor, and threatening to imprison, or, indeed, imprisoning the officer who brought it. It was Mr. Seward who placed a sentinel at Judge Merrick's door, for the double and kindred purposes of insult to him and intimidation to the electors of Maryland, and so avowed it.* It was he who

* Lord Lyons, in writing to Earl Russell, Nov. 4, 1861, says: "Mr. Seward said that he had already sent me a written answer respecting the seven seamen, and that as to the recent arrests, they had almost all been made in view of the Maryland elections; that those elections would be over in about a week's time, and that he hoped then to be able to set at liberty all the British subjects now under military arrest." Parliamentary Papers, No. 1, p. 102.

issued the orders of November, 1861, forbidding the State prisoners to employ counsel, saying that he would find in such intervention "additional reasons for declining to release them." It was Mr. Seward who, at the very time when he was ostentatiously availing himself of the services of Prelates abroad, denied to a prisoner in Fort Warren the privilege of seeing a parish priest, in a letter recently published, which, though expressed with such clumsiness that no one can tell whether vigilance was directed at the penitent or the priest, is, in any interpretation, most discreditable.* These are some of the home doings of the Secretary of State which, entirely aside from the shortcomings and follies, and worse than follies of his foreign policy, excuse the strong and earnest and resentful feeling with which every American, be he writer or reader, critic or student, must regard him. It may be found convenient at this late day, and in the face of public opinion in the North, for Mr. Seward's friends to paint him as a conservative and moderate man; but the memory of these wrongs, and the official records which we propose to examine, are too fresh and will be too permanent ever to admit of this. The reader will make what allowance he pleases for the influence on the writer's judgment of the feeling he thus proudly avows.

Now let us look at this new volume of imposture and note its history, the circumstances of its publication, and, within certain limits, its contents. All are characteristic.

Daunted no doubt by the strictures made on every side, a year ago, on the self-abnegation into which Mr. Seward seduced the President in relation to foreign affairs, he issues this volume under different auspices. Mr. Lincoln, in his odd way, does say something about foreign relations. Out of the twenty-one

* "DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, NOV. 20, 1861.

"SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 15th inst., with a copy of that which you addressed to Colonel Dimick, on the 15th November. This Department, having adopted a rule which precludes all visits to political prisoners, even from Ministers of the Gospel of any denomination, has hitherto strictly observed it. If, however, the persons themselves shall, in the event of sickness, or any other reasonable cause, require the services of their spiritual advisers, the rule will be relaxed in favor of any one of undoubted loyalty.

To the Rev. A. L. HITSELBERER, Boston College."

printed pages of the Message, three are devoted to this topic of admitted interest, and in these, are at least two statements of fact, on important points, for which Mr. Lincoln of course is only indirectly responsible, which the evidence shows to be utterly groundless. One is this—and we dismiss it incidentally, if for no other reason, because the Chief Magistrate has as little to do with the main drama of diplomacy as the chorus in one of Shakspeare's histories. He speaks a few words at the beginning, and then is heard no more. It is a pity those few words were not more truthful.

“In the month of June last,” says the Message, “there were some grounds to expect that the maritime powers which at the beginning of our domestic difficulties, so unwisely and unnecessarily, as we think, recognised the insurgents as a belligerent, would soon recede from that position which has proved only less injurious to themselves than to our own country.”

Here is a positive averment made to Congress that, in June, 1862, before the reverses on the Chickahominy, there were grounds to expect the European powers would withdraw their belligerent recognition. There can be no mistake about it. The fact is clearly stated. The time is distinctly marked. Now, a reference to Mr. Seward's despatches shows this was not so, and that at no time, least of all in June, was there any ground even for the hope. This is susceptible of clear proof.

On the 15th May, 1862, Mr. Adams wrote a despatch describing his pathetic appeal to Earl Russell, when he “supplicated his Lordship” to withdraw from the position Great Britain had thus far chosen to assume. “I supplicated his Lordship, then, not to compel me to go without the possession of the smallest evidence that could refute the inevitable arguments that would be drawn from the position that Great Britain had thus far chosen to assume during this struggle.” The Earl's answer to this rather undignified appeal is not given, but could not have been favorable, or it would have been printed. On the 22d of May, Mr. Adams writes that he had renewed his application with “little expectation of success,” and this time was not disappointed; for he says: “His Lordship replied that he did not see his way to any change of policy at present,” and added (we

fear with that grim sarcasm which statesmen occasionally indulge in) that "we seemed to be going on so fast ourselves that the question might settle itself before a great while." These letters were received in Washington from the 1st to the 10th of June, and not another word from Mr. Adams on this subject is to be found during the month, or at any time. So far, then, as England was concerned, Mr. Lincoln was utterly mistaken. How was it with France?

As early as May 5th, Mr. Seward wrote to our Minister there on this subject, remarking with his characteristic felicity of diction that "It will be a study for the historian why the European powers on the first sound of the bugle of faction, so absolutely abandoned all their former faith in the Government and people of the United States." On the 16th, Mr. Dayton, in a postscript, says Mr. Adams had told him of his failure in London, and he thinks he had better not be importunate in Paris; and on the 22d he wrote that "without further aid he could do nothing." On the 26th, the same thing was repeated, with the addition of the expression of a hope that the Rebels might not know of the failure, for, says he, in *italics*, "A knowledge of the denial of the application *would very much encourage* the rebels in their hopes." On the 2d of June, Mr. Dayton says, "I have already informed you to what extent this point has been pressed upon the attention of the French Government, and scarcely suppose, you desire me, under existing circumstances, to go further. Indeed after what has been said here, I don't see how it is possible to do so at present." This despatch was received on the 6th June, and was communicated to the President, so Mr. Seward distinctly says, and on the 20th, he wrote to Mr. Dayton a long harangue (for it can be called by no other name,) about "the popular mass surged by the voice of demagogues," and "a Confederacy of discordant States bound by a *flaxen cord*," and on the same day, it being Mr. Seward's fashion to write at least two despatches, (on one day he wrote three,) per diem, he sends one which we print in full, in order to clinch the demonstration that, when Mr. Lincoln in his message said that, in June, there was ground to expect the European powers would withdraw their recognition of the South as a belligerent,

he ought to have known, and his Secretary of State did know, that he was saying what was not true.*

“While the President regrets that, in your opinion, there is
 “no immediate prospect of success in inducing the Government
 “of France to rescind the declaration of neutrality which it
 “adopted last year, he does not at all doubt the fidelity and
 “earnestness with which you have presented the subject; and
 “he has intended to leave, as he still leaves, the prosecution of
 “that object to your own discretion, in which he reposes the
 “utmost confidence. A change of position by the maritime
 “powers is, in his judgment, essential to an early and complete
 “restoration of commerce between this country and Europe.
 “But the interest of those powers in that restoration is now
 “fully as great as our own. Having submitted our convictions
 “with frankness, and enforced them with arguments derived
 “from a full knowledge of the condition of things in this country,
 “we can now cheerfully leave the subject to the consideration
 “of parties so deeply interested. It is proper that you should
 “understand that the British and French Governments do not
 “at all hesitate to suggest to us continual modifications of a
 “blockade, unquestionably lawful in all respects, with a view to
 “facilitate their acquisition of cotton, while the concessions al-
 “ready made, seem to the President to entitle us to the exercise
 “of some reciprocal liberality on their part.”

But why this falsification? The secret is revealed in the sentence of the Message which follows the one we have quoted, and which was written when Mr. Lincoln's military antipathies were at a white heat, and when everything, defeat at home, disappointment abroad, was to be attributed to military failures. He says immediately after speaking of this alleged frustration of his hopes abroad, “But the temporary reverses which afterwards befel the national arms, and which were exaggerated by our own disloyal citizens abroad, have hitherto delayed that act of simple justice.”

Here then is another positive assertion which we regret to say is equally groundless. That there were military reverses, especially on the Peninsula, during the closing week of June,

* The only possible authority for the statement in the Message is a rumor that reached Mr. Adams in August, and which he says he did not credit.

from the battle on the 26th to the arrival at Harrison's Landing on the 2d July, is certainly true. It was one of the weeks of Mr. Lincoln's panic at Washington, when and he his counsellors had so directed the Federal army as to scatter it fruitlessly everywhere, and to prepare it for the crushing defeat of a month later. But Mr. Seward could, or would not see reverses, and was busy issuing prophetic bulletins to his agents abroad, which quite justify the bad name the word has earned. Arch-Bishop Hughes had been attending to the ultramontanists on the Continent; Bishop McIlvaine was in England, taking care of Lord Shaftesbury and the evangelicals; and Mr. Weed was directing the Prelatical team. "The army of General McClellan," wrote Mr. Seward, on the 2d June, "will be rapidly strengthened, although it is already deemed adequate to the capture of Richmond." "No American now indulges any doubt that the integrity of the Union will be triumphantly maintained!" On the 24th, he adopted a pensive and interjectional style to Mr. Adams, "You tell me that in England they point to the delays at Richmond and Corinth, and they enlarge upon the absence of displays of Union feelings in New Orleans and Norfolk. *Ah! well*, skepticism must be expected in this world in regard to new political systems, insomuch as even the Divine revelation needs the aid of miracles to make converts to a new religious faith."* On the 30th, the day of the bloody battle of Malvern Hill—on this day of sorrow and blood—the sound and

* Mr. Seward is fond of what we may call the interjectional style. In a letter to the Minister in Belgium who, in a fit of despondency, had written recommending some tampering with the press—the nature of which does not appear, the despatch being suppressed, the Secretary says: "How could we attempt to regulate the press of Europe when we cannot regulate our own? Where are the funds which would be necessary? Who the agent that could be trusted with them? What an endless chapter of political intrigues should we not be opening! Who in our country has the skill to conduct them? *No, no*," (p. 660.) Apropos of the press abroad, there is a dispatch from Mr. Motley (p. 571) which warrants the suspicion that the foreign press is sometimes enlisted in the Federal cause. He sends to the Department and it is reprinted here, a long extract from a Viennese paper, which concludes with a passage which Mr. Motley may understand, but we do not, "Nothing is easier than to show up apparent inconsistencies and æsthetical shortcomings in many of Mr. Lincoln's actions of state as is done by the English *Pindars* of slavery, the Times, and Saturday Review."

scent of which reached for many a long mile, the Secretary was in the City of New York on one of those strange ubiquitous which seem, now-a-days, to afflict Secretaries and Presidents, taking counsel with Governor Morgan and Mr. Weed, and talking jocularly for the newspapers. In his absence, Mr. F. W. Seward wrote abroad that "everything was right, and that General McClellan was nearer Richmond than before, and held his ground," and a week later, Mr. Seward himself wrote what now we read with wonder, that "every one of the battles was a repulse of the insurgents, and the two last which closed the series were decided victories," that General McClellan's modest conduct," (such was then the cue) "will be read with interest and admiration," winding up with one of the strange flourishes with which he concludes not a few of these odd documents.

"If, as fatalists argue, a certain quantity of human blood must flow to appease the dreadful spirit of faction, and enable a discontented people to recover its calmness and its reason, it may be hoped that the needful sacrifice has now been made. If the representative parties (?) had now to choose whether they would have the army where it is and as it is, or back again where it was and as it was, it is not to be doubted that the insurgents would prefer to it the position and condition on the Pamunkey, and the friends the one now attained on the bank of the James. The insurgents and the world abroad will see that the virtue of the people is adequate to the responsibility which Providence has cast upon them."

Now, while we do not, in the least, doubt that the virtue of the people is adequate to any responsibility, we may be excused, after such a rigmarole as this, for a little distrust of the virtue of some of those who have been elevated a little above the popular level.

The truth is, that if there were reverses which disloyal men exaggerated, Mr. Seward throughout, even to his confidential agents, persisted in denying them—that these reverses, whether precisely stated or exaggerated, had no such influence abroad as Mr. Lincoln now attributes to them; and that the whole fabrication of pretended effect and cause is an unworthy afterthought designed to carry out the system of malignant spite at the Peninsular Generals, which began with McClellan's re-

moval in November and ended (if it has ended) in the dismissal of General Fitz John Porter in January.

Thus did Mr. Lincoln, at Mr. Seward's bidding usher in his reference to foreign relations, with what we may mildly term a misrepresentation. It would have been better for his fame, (if such a word can be so applied,) if, as last year, he had said nothing about them.

But we do not stop here. The message thus opens, "The correspondence touching foreign affairs, which has taken place during the last year, is herewith submitted, in virtual compliance with a request to that effect made by the House of Representatives near the close of last session of Congress." One would suppose from this, that Congress had expressly or, by implication, solicited the publication of this huge volume. No such thing was dreamed of.

On reference to the record we find that, on the 9th of June, 1862, Mr. Cox, a Democratic member from Ohio and one of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, offered what we suppose to be the resolution referred to. It is not very precise in its terms. It has no reference to future correspondence. Mr. Cox accompanied it with a brief speech, in the course of which he said that, as Parliament had published part of the correspondence, he wished to have any omission supplied.* He then added, he was happy to say that he could confidently assure the House that the best understanding existed between us and the European powers. Every one familiar with the action of Congress knows that between the State Department and this Committee there is and ought to be a close sympathy—a semi-confidential relation which overrides political opposition. In fact, under existing circumstances, Mr. Cox, Democrat, from Ohio, is closer in affinity to the Secretary than some of his party friends, certainly more so than the Chairman of the Senate Committee. Such a resolution would not have been offered, or such an authoritative

* The Ministry did lay before Parliament Mr. Seward's correspondence of 1861, printing it from the copy he furnished, omitting nothing, adding nothing. What the motive was, we do not pretend to divine. Mr. Cobden, in his speech last summer at Rochdale, intimated that the intention was not at all complimentary. Lord Lyons' dispatch to Earl Russell, sending a copy of it is very significant.—Parliamentary Papers, No. 1., p. 115.

speech made, but at the prompting, or with the concurrence of the Department. Yet, on the day that Mr. Cox was at the suggestion of Mr. Seward, felicitating himself and us on the prospect of the perfect tranquillity of our foreign relations, and fancied he saw

“The birds of calm brooding on the charmed wave.”

on that very day, the Secretary, at the other end of the avenue, was writing a pettish despatch to Mr. Adams, showing his regret and the President's at the very unsatisfactory condition of things. “It is impossible,” said he, “here to understand the policy by which the British Government is persuaded that the sensibilities of this country upon the subject of its sovereignty and true independence, in such a crisis as this, can be wisely disregarded.” Mr. Cox was deceived. There really, in all this, seems to have been a tendency to indirectness, a facility of disingenuousness which threatens to revive for Mr. Seward the nick-name long ago affixed to a British Statesman—the Malagrida of our diplomacy.

One other remarkable instance of the same sort of thing may be cited, and with it, we dismiss this very disparaging and unpleasant view of Mr. Seward's public action.

On the 12th of July, 1862, he wrote to Mr. Adams that “This transaction will furnish you a suitable occasion for informing Earl Russell that since the Oreto and other gunboats are being received by the insurgents from Europe to renew demonstrations on our national commerce, Congress is about to authorize the issue of letters of marque and reprisal, and that if we find it necessary to suppress that piracy, we shall bring Privateers into service for that purpose and, of course, for that purpose only.”

Here again is a distinct and positive averment, “Congress is about to issue letters of marque and reprisal.” Now, Congress was about doing no such thing, and Mr. Seward knew it. Never was there a more deplorable *fiasco* than the feeble attempt made by the Executive to induce Congress to authorize letters of marque. A bill to that effect was introduced by Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, on the 12th July, the date of Mr. Seward's letter, and was met with such a storm of opposition from the Republican Senators, that it was scarcely allowed to be read.

It was called up two days later, the mover naively saying, that, in introducing it, he was not representing himself or his own opinions, but the wishes of the Administration, and on the 15th, three days after the Secretary had said that "Congress is about to authorize letters of marque," it was, by common consent, dropped—not a single Senator saying a word in its favor—and has never been heard of since. It was not even alluded to in the House of Representatives, and we search in vain in this volume of despatches for any correction of this grievous error or mis-statement. It looks very much as if the action of Congress, such as it was, was invoked in order to verify Mr. Seward's threat, and not that Mr. Seward told the truth as to the action of Congress. And this is thought to be fair play—this is skilful diplomacy in the nineteenth century! In former days we read of ambassadors of foreign States being watched and their despatches stolen and read. Lord Chatham, who was anything but a trickster, employed spies and detectives to dog the steps of the French minister in London in 1761. Sir Joseph Yorke was suspected of taking liberties with rebel correspondence. Mr. Fox and Lord Shelburne, though in the same cabinet, had each an agent in Paris in 1782. Lord Malmesbury was not over-scrupulous. All sorts of devices were once resorted to, and may be so still, for aught we know. But, in a small way, Mr. Seward's tortuousness has no parallel, for he seems to think that it is rather a clever thing to mislead one of his own ministers abroad, as well as the Government to which he is accredited, by the positive assertion of a fact which was no fact, and then, not only never to correct the mis-statement, but to publish it to the world as one of the trophies of his statesmanship. He has vastly improved on Sir Henry Wottons' apothegm. It is no wonder that Mr. Adams was all the time begging to be told the truth as to what was going on at home.*

* There is something touching in Mr. Adams' prayer for precise information, uttered in answer to a tremendous essay on international ethics from the Secretary. "I do not like," says he, (p. 23) "to be obliged to confess, when asked questions by persons who ought to know, touching the movements and policy of the Government, that I am not able to answer them." "I am sometimes questioned here," wrote poor Mr. Dayton, "by parties in the Government, as to the future course of events in the United States, and fear I indicate an unwarrantable ignorance, for I am constrained to say that I know nothing

Such are some of the flagrant instances of want of candor, not only in the papers themselves, but in the manner in which they have been introduced to the public—and we willingly, after this exposure, which, for the sake of what is left of our country's character, we regret the necessity of making, pass this part of the subject by.

Before considering the substance of this volume, let us—for our pledge of demolition extends to Mr. Seward's pretensions as a scholar and a writer—say a few words on its literary merits. It is, if possible, worse than Volume first. One would think that at this time of day, in the effulgence of education, no one would question that the style, the mode of expression of a Secretary of State, or even a President, was a fair subject of comment. Yet there are those who think, or pretend to think, either, that anything like literary criticism is a small business, and that, as in this case, the grave, didactic essays, or the scribblings, the light contributions from high executive officers, are too sacred to be read or commented upon, except reverently. Believing, as we do, that no right thinking man can write, we will not say badly, or clumsily, or ungrammatically, but as Mr. Seward writes—in other words, that no man, who writes as Mr. Seward does, can be a perfectly right-minded or clear-sighted man; believing this, we hold the writings of such men peculiarly fit subject of criticism. And so it is all the world over. A recent writer has well said that “There is always a dignified, straightforward way of saying things, and the sooner it is cultivated by those who frame public documents which all men are expected to read, the better.” It is this simple dignity of style, this straightforwardness, in which Mr. Seward's compositions are so deficient. To describe his rhetoric as sophomoric, is to use a mild term. It is radically defective in all the elements of good style, and the more he writes, the worse it becomes. It is pretentious to an extreme point. It is stilted. It is flippant. It is feeble. It is distressingly obscure. He is grossly inaccurate in his general knowledge, and yet excessively fond of parading it on all occasions, fit and unfit. He indulges in technicalities, and writes one day like a professor of me-

beyond what is common to all the world, while the Government and diplomats here take it for granted I ought to know a great deal more.”—Vol. 1., p. 240.

chanics (p. 179), and the next like a horse-jockey (p. 105). Let us relieve the gravity of criticism by taking a few instances of this, almost at random,—throwing perhaps into a note, for the amusement, or it may be the astonishment, of our readers, a number of specimens of literary bungling with which we do not desire to burden our text. Two specimens will suffice here.

There is on the eastern side of Hudson's Bay, at least fifteen degrees of longitude, and, as the bird flies, a thousand miles of measurement from the sources of the Mississippi, a region called "Prince Rupert's Land," perfectly well known to every student of Arctic adventure, and one would suppose, to the copying clerks in the State Department. Mr. Seward, writing on the 7th July to Mr. Adams, of Commodore Farragut passing the batteries at Vicksburg, says: "Thus the last obstacle of the navigation of the Mississippi has been overcome, and it is open to trade once more from the head waters of its tributaries, near the Lakes and *Prince Rupert's Land*, to the Gulf of Mexico!"

So much for geography; but history fares worse at the Secretary's hands. He calls the motto of the Order of the Garter "the motto of the national arms"! He affirms with great stateliness, in one of his most elaborate essays on matters and things in general, that "Richelieu occupied and fortified a large portion of this continent, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Straits of Belle Isle." There is not a college boy who does not know that the Cardinal was in his quiet grave in the Sorbonne, and had been there thirty years, before the Mississippi was discovered, either at its source or its mouth. But let the passage speak for itself.

"Rather than do this, I willingly turn away from the spectacle of servile war and war abroad—of military devastation on land, and of a carnival of public and private cupidity on the seas, which has been presented to me—to set down with calmness some reflections calculated to avert an issue so unnecessary and so fatal, which you may possibly find suitable occasion for suggesting to the rulers of Great Britain. For what was this great continent, brought up, as it were, from the depths of what before had been known as 'the dark and stormy ocean?' Did the European States which found and occupied it, almost without effort, then understand its real

Richelieu
1565 ed. 16
1496 ed. 15
Richelieu
1565 ed. 16

“destiny and purposes? Have they ever yet fully understood and accepted them? Has anything but disappointment upon disappointment, and disaster upon disaster, resulted from their misapprehensions? After near four hundred years of such disappointments and disasters, is the way of Providence in regard to America still so mysterious that it cannot be understood and confessed? Columbus, it was said, had given a new world to the kingdoms of Castile and Leon. What has become of the sovereignty of Spain in America? Richelieu occupied and fortified a large portion of the continent, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Straits of Belle Isle. Does France yet retain that important appendage to the crown of her sovereign? Great Britain acquired a dominion here, surpassing, by an hundred fold in length and breadth, the native realm. Has not a large portion of it been already formally resigned? To whom have these vast dominions, with those founded by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the Swedes, been resigned, but to American nations, the growth of European colonists and exiles, who have comè hither, bringing with them the arts, the civilization, and the virtues of Europe?”

It is not to be wondered at, that poor Mr. Adams groaned in spirit under such a style of despatch-writing as this, in which interrogation and declamation are so strangely mixed, and all the scraps of imperfect knowledge, historical and ethnological, which Mr. Seward ever had, are collated in order to fill the diplomatic mail bag. It is, however, when poetry and history combine that the peculiarities of the Secretary's rhetoric, to use his favorite phrase, “culminate.”* Witness the despatch to Mr. Harvey, on the 4th of August, in reply to the information naturally enough given by that gentleman, though in rather grandiloquent phrase, that he had attended the ceremony of laying the corner-stone of a monument to Camoens. Lest we may do injustice to this gem of the collection—for so Mr. Seward evidently regards it—the despatch being exclusively

* In a short despatch to Mr. Motley (p. 550) he says: “Passion is as natural a condition for nations as for individuals. Secession is a popular excitement, disturbance, passion. It was needful that the new popular passion should *culminate* before it could be expected to subside, and to do this, it must have time. The *culmination* at home and abroad could be hastened or delayed by accident.”

devoted to the one topic of the adventurous poet of the East, we quote it *in extenso*, begging our readers to observe the graceful allusion, at the end, to the Portuguese slave trade, with which poor Camoens had no more to do than he had with the discovery of the continent—he dying at Lisbon in 1579, and the Portuguese traffic in slaves in this hemisphere beginning in 1630.

“DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
“WASHINGTON, August 4, 1862.

“SIR:—Your despatch of June 29, has been received. The
“erection of a monument in Lisbon to the memory of the im-
“mortal poet of Portugal was not merely an act of national
“justice and a proper manifestation of national pride. It illus-
“trated the eclectic, conservative faculty of nations, by which
“they rescue and save whatever is great, good, useful and
“humane, from the wrecks of time, leaving what is worthless,
“vicious, or pernicious, to pass into oblivion.

“The incident seems doubtless the more pleasing to us, be-
“cause it occurs at this conjuncture, when we are engaged in
“combatting, in its full development, a gigantic error which
“Portugal, in the age of Camoens, brought into this continent.
“I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

“W. H. SEWARD.”

The whole correspondence with Mr. Harvey, we may incidentally remark, is redolent of that rhetorical perfume to which Mr. Seward is so much addicted. We add a specimen—being the first of the series—noting in passing our entire unconsciousness of the meaning or appropriateness of the opening sentence, as to what the educational question is, and what Mr. Harvey at Lisbon has to do with the French Emperor.

“WASHINGTON, July 9, 1862.

“Sir:—Your despatch of June 5th was received. I think
“the Portuguese government and nation are to be congratulated
“upon the solution of the educational question, which the French
“Emperor has so quietly and promptly effected.

“How much the old European nations suffer from the immo-
“bility of classes and masses which this new nation needs! We
“could receive and employ all the conscientious teachers of
“Europe without fear of danger from their imputed heresies in

“politics or in religion. France, Belgium and England are agitated and excited to make war against and destroy us by classes of persons thrown out of employment, who, if they should make their way here, would find abundant and harmless occupation, with large rewards. Indeed, some of them might become founders of States which would, at no distant day, become as great as those which are disordered by reason of their wants. Let us hope that the European mind may be sagacious enough to discern that the cure for all the social evils in both hemispheres is the migration of surplus population to regions where population is deficient. If it does not like us of the United States, why should Spanish America be longer left to languish for want of the invigoration which European emigration would afford.”*

We have room but for two other ludicrous instances of Mr. Seward's mode of composition.

In a despatch to the Dutch Minister, Mr. Van Limburg; for the Netherlands seem to have had trouble on both sides of the Atlantic, with Mr. Pike of the Tribune at the Hague, and General Butler at New Orleans, Mr. Seward thus oddly describes the functions of his own department :

“It appears beyond dispute that the person of the Consul was unnecessarily and rudely searched; that certain papers which incontestably were archives of the consulate were seized and removed, and they are still withheld from him, and that he was not only denied the privilege of conferring with a friendly colleague but was addressed in very discourteous and disrespectful language. In these proceedings the military agents assumed functions which belong exclusively to the Department of State, acting under the directions of the President.”

For referring to the other, we crave some indulgence, being

* The practical good sense of the Portuguese Minister of State is shown in his answer, so artlessly reported by Mr. Harvey, to the request to exclude the Confederate steamers from the Western Isles. “The Viscount Bandeira was frank enough to say to me that the islands in question had been used and abused by corsairs and pirates during centuries—that they were exposed and unprotected, and therefore might be so employed again, *and that our best plan would be to send a sufficient force there to protect American ships against threatened depredations, and to punish the criminal offenders.*”—Page 388.

quite sure that, were it found anywhere but in a volume of grave diplomatic papers, its grossness would be inexcusable. Even as it is, we refer to it cautiously. There is—every adult reader is aware—a euphemism by which when a household is gladdened by the birth of a babe—the convalescence of the mother is described in technical and courtly phrase—“that the mother is getting on as well as could be expected.” It has been reserved for Mr. Seward to embody this phrase in a diplomatic despatch with a degree of obstetrical circumstantiality which is very remarkable. Writing to Mr. Adams, on the 18th of July, 1862, (and we beg the incredulous reader to verify our literal quotation,) he says:

“All the rivers, canals, lakes, and railroads before mentioned, are free from obstructions; Vicksburg is besieged and must soon fall, Mobile and Charleston will fall soon thereafter. The work of pacification in the region concerned *is going on as successfully as could be expected*. You hear of occasional guerilla raids, but these are only the *after pangs* of revolution in that quarter which has proved *an abortion*.”

It is the insensibility to decorum manifested in so nasty an illustration that accounts for what otherwise would be an inscrutable puzzle with all men of the least taste, or experience in public affairs, how a Secretary of State, who must necessarily suffer from the recoil of his own follies, could authorize, still less instigate the publication of many of the confidential papers in this volume. The simple truth is, that did not foreign statesmen regard, (as we hope they do,) the Lincoln Administration, and especially Mr. Seward, as in every sense exceptional and irresponsible, there is enough in this volume, its authorized publication being the offence, to embroil us with every nation beyond the jagged edges of what is left of the United States. Especially is this the case with the power with whom just now friendship seems most precarious, the Emperor of the French. It is full of revelations not only of Mr. Adams' private movements and conversations in relation to the French operations in Mexico, and his exultation at the disappointments which seemed to attend them, but of an elaborate and systematic, though apparently ineffectual, intrigue at Madrid to detach Spain from its French connections, all of which may have been right enough

in themselves, but ought not, unless offence was intended or foreign war desired—to have been authoritatively published. There is enough in the foolish book to exclude Mr. Adams from anything like unreserved social or official intercourse in London, and we can imagine Mr. Dayton's dismay and perplexity if Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, or the Emperor himself were to ask an explanation of the following passage from a despatch of Mr. Pike at the Hague, now given to the world under the *imprimatur* of our government.

“The movement in Mexico,” he writes on the 28th May, “as viewed here, in well informed circles, is regarded as developing a purpose on the part of the Emperor to strengthen his prestige and his dynasty by coming forward as the supporter of the church party in that country. Though not in favor with the Catholics, he makes himself necessary to them in Rome, and he seems to aim to occupy a similar position in Mexico. It is undoubtedly in harmony with his plans to put money in the pockets of influential supporters of the empire, by giving value under a new regime to existing Mexican securities in their possession which are at present worthless.”

A more disparaging insinuation could not be made. The same remark applies with equal force to the exposure of the kindred follies of Mr. Clay and Mr. Motley, which, were there any sense of propriety left at Washington, ought, instead of being ostentatiously published, to be buried in the deepest pigeon-hole of the department. The indiscretion extends everywhere—even where words of civility are used. Mr. De Stoeckel, than whom the diplomatic body can boast of no more shrewd and far-seeing member, made so by his long residence here and his thorough acquaintance with all our public men, Mr. Seward included, is described as a well-meaning individual, “the excellent Russian Minister,” but too tender-hearted for the crisis, and too apt—poor deluded man—to look at the ghastly aspect of a war which Mr. Seward elsewhere describes as not a “mild one.” Mr. Bertinatti and Baron Ricasoli learn from this book that while, at one time, Mr. Seward is exuberant in his love for their sovereign, and Mr. Marsh boasts that “in no part of the continent was the sympathy with the Government of the Union so strong and universal as in Italy,” meaning

liberalized Italy, at another, Mr. Seward thanks Cardinal Antonelli for his especial sympathy. "The good wishes," says he, "expressed by that statesman are such as the Government expected from him, and his convictions that, in rejecting all ideas of concession or compromise with our domestic enemies, this Government is pursuing its proper and necessary policy, are as creditable to his Eminence as they are gratifying to the United States."* Nor is this all. In July, 1861, in the midst of the first Bull Run panic, as this volume admits, the Executive invited Garibaldi to take a high command, we believe a Major-Generalship, in the Federal army. The offer was declined for the reason that the policy of the administration was not then sufficiently advanced in the direction of Abolition. Mr. Seward now says that it was made with the consent of the King of Sardinia, which, if it be the fact, gives color to the belief that as far back as the time we have indicated, that government was quite willing to be rid of the adventurous and troublesome chieftain, and transfer him to the Federal service

* Mr. Motley sees close parallels between Mr. Lincoln's Government and that of Austria. "The Grand Vizier," writes Mr. Morris, "exhibits a warm sympathy with the Union cause"—and the Viceroy of Egypt thinks that the war should be prosecuted fiercely, and 'His Highness,' says our Consul, Mr. Thayer, 'is the son of Mahomet-Ali, and may speak with hereditary authority on questions of this kind.'" For fear our readers may not estimate the weight of this authority, we quote from a cotemporary, a brief statement of Mahomet-Ali's mode of conducting war vigorously :

"A horrible fate awaited those who had shut themselves up in the Palace; they begged for quarter and surrendered, were immediately stripped nearly naked, and about fifty were slaughtered on the spot, and about the same number were dragged away with every brutal aggravation of their pitiful condition to Mohammed Ali. Among them were four Beys, one of whom, driven to madness by Mohammed Ali's mockery, asked for a drink of water; his hands were untied, that he might take the bottle, but he snatched a dagger from one of the soldiers, and rushed at the Pasha, and fell, covered with wounds. The wretched captives were then chained, and left in the court of the Pasha's house; and on the following morning the heads of their comrades who had perished the day before, were skinned and stuffed with straw, before their eyes. One Bey and two others paid their ransom and were released; the rest, without exception, were tortured and put to death in the course of the ensuing night. Eighty-three heads (many of them those of Frenchmen and Albanians) were stuffed and sent to Constantinople, with a boast that the Mameluke chiefs were utterly destroyed. Thus ended Mohammed Ali's massacre of his too confiding enemies."

here. It was fortunate the invitation was declined, for soon after, having taken the Archbishop of New York into his confidence, and sent him as one of his Nuncios to Europe, Mr. Seward had to extricate himself from his liberal entanglement. The prelate could scarcely reconcile it with his paramount duty at Rome, to be a fellow-labourer with one who, like Garibaldi, had denounced the Papacy as "the most wicked and loathsome government in the world," and on another occasion had spoken of it as "a hideous immoral monstrosity." Indeed there is, in this volume, abundant evidence that the Papal influence, love for Cardinal Antonelli and the Emperor of Austria, very early triumphed in Mr. Seward's heart over all liberal sympathy. The Lincoln administration could indeed ill afford to quarrel with the absolutists of Europe. But its agents abroad, the subordinate ones at least, did not know this, and accordingly, we find that in September, 1862, Mr. Theodore Canisius, our consul at Vienna, following the example set the year before at Antwerp, of his own accord, renewed the invitation to Garibaldi. "The delight," said the simple-minded consul, "with which you would be received in our country, would be immense, and your mission, which would be to lead our brave soldiers to fight for the same principles to which you have devoted your life, would be fully conformable to your intentions." This time, unluckily, Garibaldi agreed to come, saying, that "so soon as his wounds were healed he should be glad to satisfy his desire to serve the Great American Republic, which is now fighting for universal liberty." They, the consul and the hero, little dreamed of the change which had in the interval come over Mr. Seward's spirit. He was fighting no longer for liberty, but for absolute supremacy and imperial authority. The absolutists were smiling on him. The smile must be reflected. Early in October he had received Cardinal Antonelli's honied words. About the same time Mr. Motley wrote to him that the "entire sympathy" of Austria was with the administration in its efforts to suppress, what the historian of the Dutch Republic calls, "the mutiny of the South." The Turks and Egyptians were sympathetic. Mr. Burlingame thought the Taepings were on the wane, and Mr. Seward at once and roughly recalled poor Mr. Canisius, telling him that "at the present conjuncture, every care is necessarily

to be taken to avoid injurious complications in foreign affairs ;" that what had been done was "entirely divergent from judicious policy," and that Garibaldi was neither more nor less than a "rebel." This recall, thus derogatory alike to the unlucky consul, to Garibaldi, and, in view of what had occurred, to the writer, Mr. Motley was directed to show to the Austrian Prime Minister.

And this revelation of inconsistency, this insult to the liberal spirit of the day, this confession of a grievous mistake, is put in print as one of the bright trophies of a statesman.*

The stupendous folly, and worse than folly, of the publication of this volume cannot, therefore, be too strongly stated. Should the normal condition of things at Washington ever be resumed, it will, we trust, be a warning to all future Departments of State, and an admonition to reserve that will never be forgotten. The mischief, we fear, is irreparable.

But what, let us ask, are the actual fruits of this paraded diplomacy? Absolutely nothing—for we undertake, without effort, to show,

1st. That there is no ground for the claim put forward by Mr. Seward's friends, that he deserves credit for preventing European mediation or intervention, for the simple reason that no foreign power has ever, till lately, dreamed of mediating or intervening, and then, when the attempt was indirectly made by France, Mr. Seward knew nothing about it.

2d. That in the only matter in which he took the initiative and pursued it—the effort to have the belligerent recognition withdrawn—he absolutely failed, and why he failed.

3d. That it is a budget of blunders from first to last, and that

* Mr. Seward's despatches to China are "unique." For example let the reader observe the oddity of the following, dated 22d April, 1862: "The solicitude you have suffered, and which was so honorable to your loyalty and patriotism, will have been relieved before this time by information that we have greatly reduced, if not altogether averted, the danger of foreign war, and have at the same time, obtained a very fair prospect of early domestic peace. In view of civil war raging in Greece and in China, and of rising commotions in Italy, Hungary and Germany, we may reasonably hope that Europe will become less severe and censorious in regard to the unhappy demonstrations of faction in our heretofore tranquil and united country." "It is your duty," said he in another place, "especially to lend no aid, encouragement or countenance to sedition or rebellion against imperial authority."

the blunders have been committed at the expense of his country's traditionary principles.

Let us examine this subject briefly and fairly, following, as far as possible, the easy order of time.

The diplomatic, like the fiscal year, under our system, is not coincident with the old fashioned one of the calendar. Mr. Seward's year begins and ends in December. The close of 1861 was very dreary, and no American, be his political affinities what they may, can think of it without a shudder and a blush. It was the era of the "Trent." Scarcely had the Secretary of State bundled up and put in the printer's hand, his volume of first fruits of diplomacy, scarcely had he with the air of one contented with laborious success, written to his favorite minister (p. 274) that he now looked to see less disposition abroad to treat our flag with disrespect, when the news broke on the American public that Captain Wilkes had forcibly taken from a British steamer the Confederate commissioners, and brought them to this country. So much has since occurred, so much blood has been shed and agony endured, so sharp have been the spasms of exultation and despair that have convulsed us in the progress of this most wretched war, that it is not easy to recall distinctly the panic—for such in truth it was—of the closing month of 1861, from the day the news of the capture came (Nov. 16) to the day when it was known the surrender was decided on. It is not worth while to reopen this question; but looking back on it, as one can do with relative composure, there are one or two points now apparent which were not so then, and there is, it will be conceded, a settled judgment on the whole evidence, that but for the attitude taken by Great Britain, sustained as it was by the unanimity of the world, the Federal administration would have evaded what they now pretend was a voluntary act. In other words, that it was fear—reasonable enough—and not the conviction of having done a wrong, or the recognition of a principle, which induced the action of the Government. This it is, and the recollection of a narrow escape from a foreign war, which causes the scandal and the blush. The world will never know the miserable secrets of office in that interval. The Secretary of State literally hid himself. On the 13th November, Mr. Russell, of the Times, then a prime favorite, was

dining with Mr. Seward, who pleasantly told him that "the English were the great smugglers who sustained the rebellion." On the 14th, there was another dinner with Mr. Seward, a cheerful game of whist, and "Mr. Lincoln dropped in with a new supply of west country jokes."* On the 16th came the news, and the administration went into "Retreat." As late as the 25th they were invisible; indeed it would seem they were so till the end of the month. "I have neither sought nor avoided an interview with Mr. Seward," wrote Lord Lyons, "but it has so happened, I have not seen him, nor, indeed, any member of the Government, since the intelligence of the capture arrived." Then came the Message, without a word on the engrossing topic, and the Navy Department endorsement, and the vote of the House of Representatives to throw the prisoners into close confinement, and anxiety deepened; and so it continued, till the 18th of December, when "the messenger Seymour," arrived with the seven days ultimatum, and the ominous freight of diplomatic urgency from every cabinet in Europe. General Scott hurried home, confident of a war; for he did not dream the prisoners would be given up without more of a struggle. Private letters flowed in, filled with alarms and counsel, and, among them, one to the Secretary himself, to which, in the unravelling of this perplexity, sufficient attention has not been paid, for it was the only one we know of, that suggested the exact course which was adopted. Those familiar with Mr. Seward's antecedents know his close affiliation to Irish politicians, their sympathies and antipathies. It is the basis of his intimacy with the Arch-Bishopal incumbent of New York. On the 2d of December, 1861, Mr. Smith O'Brien wrote a long letter to his friend the Secretary of State, which must have been received at Washington coincidently with Earl Russell's despatch, and which gave the clue for the dark labyrinth of difficulty—of impending danger, and threatened dishonour—in which he was wandering. "Answer the British demands," wrote Mr. O'Brien, "in the language of diplomacy. Quote authorities and precedents to show that you are justified by the Law of Nations, and especially by the example of England, in the seizure of these commissioners. Such discussions will give you

* Russell's "My Diary."

time for deliberation and for preparation ; but lose not an hour in liberating the commissioners." This is exactly what Mr. Seward did, and thus, on the face of the evidence, it would seem that to this Irish hint is due the result at which the world rejoiced and felt relieved, and the nation blushed. It is a sad chapter, view it as we may, and we gladly turn from it.

One effect, or rather consequence, of the Trent affair, was a fit of comparative silence on the part of the Secretary of State. While, during the rest of the year, the average of his despatches is nearly thirty a month, in January, 1862, he wrote but ten, and those were brief and meagre. The elasticity of his spirit seemed broken. Mr. Adams wrote to him on the 10th, and the despatch, though acknowledged, is suppressed. Mr. Marsh spoke of the "wisdom and skill" of the cabinet, but extorted no answer, and again wrote Mr. Adams on the 17th: "I need not add my testimony to the general tribute of admiration of the skilful manner in which the various difficulties and complications attending this unfortunate business have been met and avoided"—and Mr. Seward turned with ghastly nausea away from such praises. It was, however, while thus abstinent from foreign correspondence, that he was engaged actively at home, for, about this time, occurred the correspondence with Ex-President Pierce, as to which, no words of reprobation can be found too strong. One reads it now, with absolute amazement that such a violation of decency could have occurred, even here.

But, with the lengthening days of February, Mr. Seward began to rally, and in that month he wrote no less than twenty-one despatches, the majority being to Mr. Adams, constituting the opening chapter of his new and fruitless experiments to persuade the European powers to withdraw or modify their recognition of the Confederates as belligerents. It was chiefly directed to Great Britain. It began and continued in humiliation, and ended, as we have said, in disappointment.

Before proceeding briefly to consider this sad story of diplomatic bungling, it is due to historical truth to say, that while Mr. Seward directed his energies—if such they can be termed—mainly to influence the British cabinet, he never seems to have done justice, or to have fairly estimated, what these and

later revelations show was the fair and friendly action of the French Emperor. To England, as we will show, he was prepared to make any concession—to France, he was, if not churlish and discourteous, silent and suspicious. Lord Russell (in the true spirit of the Whigs) never was at heart very friendly to us. The spirit of Abolitionism—at this moment as acrid as ever in a certain, but, we hope, limited class of Englishmen—alone kept in check the adverse policy of a portion of the ministry. It was “the willing to wound and yet afraid to strike” policy throughout. It tried to please all sides in a surly fashion. Mr. Gladstone said one thing here, and Sir George Lewis another thing there. They refused to recall Mr. Bunch from Charleston, and yet they never actually *demand*ed the release of a prisoner from the bastiles. The Russell policy to America was a companion to what had been doing in Prussia and Denmark, in Greece and Rome.

And yet, to this government, Mr. Seward was never wearied of making surrenders. Let us see what and how fruitless they were. The memory of some of them is fading away, and ought to be revived.

On the 4th January, 1862, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams, transmitting the copy of an unofficial letter he had sent to Lord Lyons, together with one which, “amid the intensest heat of the late excitement,” he had addressed to the Governor of Maine. This is the only reference we find to what is, in our estimation, one of the most remarkable of Mr. Seward’s many freaks—his offer of a transit to the British reinforcements for Canada over the territory of the State of Maine. The Trent affair was, as we have seen, only partially settled on the 26th of December. That is, the surrender of the prisoners was agreed to, but no one can read Lord Lyons’ despatch of that day without seeing that he had grave doubts whether the apology would be deemed sufficient. It proved to be so, but Mr. Seward did not know it till nearly a month later. He was right, therefore, in speaking of the excitement as still continuing. On the 4th January, news reached Washington that a large detachment of British troops, intended to garrison our frontier, was about to arrive in the steamer “Bohemian.” These troops were intended, in case of probable difficulty, to fight us. They were to be

scattered, with others, throughout the long line of forts from Quebec to Malden; and the artillery which accompanied them was to be pointed at Ogdensburg, or Lewistown, or Buffalo, or Detroit. They were, in no sense, soldiers crossing a neutral territory, for which consent, when asked, is sometimes given. It was not like the transit from Alexandria to Suez, during the India mutiny. They were sent to Canada in possible hostility to us. And yet the Secretary of State thought it right, unsolicited, and without consulting the local authorities, to send orders to the marshal and other Federal officers at Portland to give "the agents of the British Government all proper facilities for landing or carrying to Canada, or elsewhere, all troops or munitions of war, of every kind without exception." One reads such an order now with wonder and incredulity. Need any one be surprised that the authorities of the State of Maine were startled, and remonstrated, and that, too, when the invading troops did not come, or that they claimed some right over their own soil and their own highways? What would have been thought twenty, or ten, or five years ago, in our normal condition, had a Secretary of State, or President sent an order for foreign soldiers, with all the accomplishments of war—"munitions without exception"—artillery and baggage wagons—caissons and ambulances to pass through the borders of a State? Let it be supposed that the point to be reinforced was Windsor or Sandwich, opposite Detroit, to which the shortest line of approach is from New York or Philadelphia; does any sane man imagine that at either of those cities, British troops could be safely landed, to be carried over our railways, "with munitions of war of every kind, without exception," especially when it was known and admitted that the object of these very reinforcements was war on our borders and against us? Neither Secretary of State, nor President of the United States has any right, or pretence of right, to put a foreign soldier on the soil of any State, and no one knows this better than Mr. Seward. But, in his haste to propitiate Great Britain, he forgot it all, and, like every other humiliation to which he subjected himself and his country, it was fruitless; for we search in vain through his own despatches, the parliamentary Blue Books, and the

newspapers, for any kind word which this act of gratuitous submission extorted.

This was humiliation in the germ. Let us go on to its blushing flowers and bitter fruits.

The Slave Trade Treaty was the next voluntary sacrifice, and as to this, scarcely one word is to be found in the volume of which Mr. Seward is so proud. It deserves a distinct consideration.

There were once—when we had a country and a name—two traditional principles closely cherished in the hearts of the American people: the absolute sanctity of the flag, with a denial of the right of police search on the ocean, and the Monroe Doctrine. We now think of them as of the dead. When in life and vigour—and especially is this true of the second—they were troublesome and sometimes inconvenient, but they had their root in a high national spirit, and they expressed a sense of national power. The fatuity of Mr. Lincoln's Government has sacrificed them both; the Monroe Doctrine perhaps from necessity, but the sanctity of the flag, as we can demonstrate, voluntarily, fruitlessly, and, as we think, shamefully. Mr. Seward may think nothing of it, but this reversal of history, this renunciation of ancient policy, gives a sharp pang. It is a companion shame to the Trent surrender, without the duress. When, forty-five years ago, Mr. Wilberforce hinted such a thing in a qualified form to Mr. J. Q. Adams, the reply was, "My countrymen will never assent to such an arrangement." When, six years later, Mr. Rush signed a convention to this effect with Sir Stratford Canning and Mr. Huskisson, the Senate amended it so as to prevent its application to the American coasts, and then it was rejected by England. General Jackson, in 1834, directed his Secretary of State to say to Sir Charles Vaughan that "the United States were resolved never to become a party to any convention on this subject;" and this, said Mr. Benton, speaking of it, years afterwards, was "the true American answer." It was Mr. Cass's diplomatic triumph in France to prevent this interpolation into the law of nations in 1841. Mr. Webster refused to recognize it in his negotiations with Lord Ashburton, as did Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Everett with Lord Aberdeen, even in its new disguise of "visitation." "Without

intending," said Mr. Webster in one of his gravest depatches to General Cass, "or desiring to influence the policy of other governments on this important subject, this Government has reflected on what was due to its own character and position, as the leading maritime power on the American continent, left free to make choice of such means for the fulfilment of its duties as it should deem best suited to its dignity. The result of its reflections has been that it does not concur in measures which, for whatever benevolent purpose they may be adopted, or with whatever care or moderation they may be exercised, have a tendency to place the police of the seas in the hands of a single Power." As recently as 1858, for the continuity of precedents is perfect, President Buchanan said with emphasis, "The occasional abuse of the flag is an evil far less to be deprecated than would be the establishment of any regulations incompatible with the freedom of the seas." "I don't want any negotiations," said Mr. Crittenden in the Senate, "with Great Britain, or any discussion with Great Britain, about the right of search or right of visitation. That is a subject which is exhausted, for our minds are made up about it. I should think it unworthy of this Government to enter into any negotiation on the subject." "Without referring," said Mr. Dallas in London, "to this question more closely, it is a point which is essentially connected with one of the fundamental principles of the American Revolution, that principle being the necessity of maintaining on behalf of the great American people, as a great community, the independence of their flag. I am not now going to argue this question as to visit and search, but I should like, on the Fourth of July, to announce to my fellow-countrymen, that visit and search, in regard to American vessels in time of peace, is finally ended." "We have never," said *Senator Seward*, on the 29th of May, 1858, four short years ago, "We have never recognized this pretension of Great Britain, and *we never will*. Therefore, it is that, for twenty years past, I have never looked into a law book to ascertain the law in regard to this subject. It is enough that the claim cannot be permitted. It is enough that it would destroy the equality of nations. It is enough that it is a claim on the part of another power to

exercise vigilance and supervision over the conduct of this nation."*

Great must have been Lord Lyons' delight and surprise when, if this record tells the whole story, on the 22d of March, Mr. Seward, in hot haste, wrote to him, offering to surrender everything—traditions, prejudice, associations, history, everything—in order to put down a trade which, according to his own showing, neither Americans, nor English had any part in, and telling him that, if the suggestion were agreeable, he had the project of a Convention ready for signature. Lord Lyons has said that he was never more astonished in his life. He did not, and could not, hesitate. The diplomatic fruit at which every British statesman—every Minister in this country, from Sir Augustus Foster downwards—had been stretching out his hand, and looking anxiously, fell at his feet, Mr. Seward shaking the tree. On the same day, (22d,) Lord Lyons agreed to it. Before the 28th, the Convention was revised and ready for signature, for, we find on that day a further experiment was made on Mr. Seward's facility in a suggestion to make the treaty perpetual; and, on the 7th April, the whole gestation being a fortnight, a compact was made for ten years, by which an unlimited right of police search within liberal geographical limits was granted to English cruisers, and mixed judicial commissions were instituted on the coast of Africa, and in the city of New York. It was ratified, of course, by the Abolitionized Senate, and is now the law of this part of the land. For his share in it, Lord Lyons received, what, no doubt, he is on every account well entitled to, the honour of the Grand Cross of the Bath. If the venerable statesman who, in 1824, signed a treaty of this kind with Mr. Rush, and who still survives, ever turns his mind from the Orient to the Occidental world, (occidental, we fear, in every sense,) he may be excused for wonder at the miraculous decay in American statesmen, of that fierce, obstructive, chivalrous spirit which once snuffed danger to national honour in any breeze that affected our flag on the ocean.

Since 1842, says Mr. Seward, but one American vessel (the *Wanderer*) has ever landed an African on our soil. In March, 1862, (p. 45) he boasted that the blockade of the Southern

* Lawrence on the Right of Visit and Search, pages 94—117.

coasts was as effective as the world had ever known. Slaves certainly could not be landed then. The emancipation policy was germinating, which, if successful, according to the theory of its authors and advocates, would put an end to slavery, and of course the slave trade. The Constitution of the Confederate States, (a surer guaranty than any treaty that could be patched up at Washington,) prohibited the trade.* There was no conceivable inducement at that time to make an anti-slave trade compact, unless one is to be found, (and this is our theory,) in the willingness to propitiate the anti-slavery party of Great Britain, and seduce Lord Palmerston's Government into a retraction of the belligerent recognition of the South. We challenge the detection of any other. We shall presently see how fruitless, how pernicious, and, in the estimate of other nations, how discreditable it was.

Fruitless it certainly was, if the end proposed was a change in the policy of Great Britain. This volume, in which, by-the-by, there is a significant silence as to the Seward surrenders, shows that not a feature of the Russell countenance towards North and South relaxed, even at this sacrifice. The Earl was, if possible, sterner and more captious than before. With others in Great Britain, those we mean of a different party, the Opposition, whose possible accession to power a cautious diplomatist should always consider, the effect of this humiliation was positively evil. "The quarrel between North and South," says a leading organ of the Tory party, "has given us an opportunity which has been used of putting an end to what was left of the Slave trade. The dominant party of the North has not been sorry to gain credit cheaply for a certain degree of sincerity in its abuse of slavery. The Stars and Stripes cannot again, if we show ourselves disposed to enforce the treaty obligations into which Mr. Lincoln has entered, even at the cost of war, be used to cover this traffic. It is not to be supposed, we should recognise the Confederate States without exacting that they should hold themselves bound by the spirit of the old compact between England and the Union of which they formed a part; and it

* See Mr. Benjamin's intercepted letter on this subject, where the relations of the Confederate States are defined.

will certainly be the duty of the Government to obtain such guarantees as, without infringing the independence or affronting the jealous susceptibilities of the Southern people, will make it impossible that the Confederate flag, the flag which Lee, and Beauregard, and Stonewall Jackson have taught us to honour—shall ever be disgraced, as the Federal colours so often were, by floating from the mast of a slaver. There will be no difficulty in obtaining such a treaty. The Confederates have not the slightest desire to revive the slave trade; their Constitution, their State laws, and the interests of their ruling class, as well as the strong opinion of the country, are against it. And they cannot conceive that their dignity would be compromised by doing what France, and Spain, the United States and Brazil, have voluntarily done. There will be no difficulty, then, in making this war the means of ensuring the final extinction of the slave trade. Indeed, when the North was forced to abandon it, it was virtually destroyed.”*

This is poor consolation for Mr. Seward’s renunciation of ancient principles.

Dangerous, practically, this treaty has been, or may prove to be. By one of its provisions the police supervision of Great Britain is extended to a distance of thirty leagues, not from certain portions, but from the whole coast of Cuba. Now, waiving the apparent indecorum of defining the extent of such a concession by measurement from the limits of a friendly, though jealous power, it is apparent that a line of thirty leagues from Point Yeacos or Matanzas would touch the Florida Keys, so that our coast, supposing it still to be ours, and narrow seas, are placed under this annoying surveillance. No other independent power on earth, not even Hayti, ever made such a concession,† and this, too, at a moment, when, in view of possible contingencies, it is the obvious policy of the Northern Government to remove as far away as possible the naval forces of European powers, who, though to-day neutrals, may to-morrow become belligerents. In a letter from the British Chargé d’Affaires of September 13, 1862, is a formidable list of “Her

* The Standard, January 6, 1863.

† Article IV., Treaty of Hayti with Great Britain, 1839.

Majesty's ships employed in the suppression of the slave trade at North America and the West Indies," comprising two line-of-battle ships, (an odd craft for such a service,) four frigates, four corvettes, and eleven gun-boats, with an aggregate armament of 485 guns, twice as many as are appropriated to the whole continent of Africa, from Sierra Leone to the mouth of the Red Sea. Of course, the presence of such squadrons, however discreetly managed, leads to trouble. This volume contains more than one complaint of "unreasonable searches and seizures" (p. 284) under this very treaty, and the old story of harsh conduct to our "innocent merchantmen" begins to fill our newspapers.*

If thus fruitless, and with this germ of possible mischief, can such a compact be otherwise than discreditable in the estimation of foreign nations, and especially of that one great Power who, on this question of the freedom of the seas, has stood firmly by us? On this topic, the volume is painfully silent, and if the French Government uttered or intimated sorrow, or dissent, or reproach, it has been suppressed. The Spanish authorities were not so reticent, for we find in a despatch from Mr. Perry, at Madrid, (p. 509,) the following curious statement of what that Government thought, which we quote at length:

"At a recent interview with Mr. Calderon Collantes, that minister enquired if I had received a copy of the treaty recently concluded between the United States and England, concerning the mutual right of search, for the suppression of the African slave trade. He was much surprised that after combatting that principle so long, the United States should have yielded now a right so exceedingly liable to be abused in practice, and he was very curious to know what provisions had been stipulated to guard the exercise of the right from such abuse. I replied, regretting I could give no information other than what Mr. Calderon had himself seen in the newspapers. I understood, however, that the stoppage of the use

* The case of the "Morning Star," reported in the Evening Post of January 16th, 1863. In August last, Mr. Stuart, the British Chargé, informed Mr. Seward that Her Majesty's ship Griffin had captured and burned off Loando an American barque, fitted for the slave trade, and *belonging to New York*. The letter was acknowledged by Mr. Seward, who oddly enough said, I thank you for the information thus communicated, *which is in every respect entirely acceptable and gratifying*.

“ of the American flag in the slave trade was an object which
 “ would naturally commend itself to the favor of the present
 “ Government of the United States, and I enquired if Spain
 “ had not herself conceded the same right. Mr. Calderon said
 “ that she had, at a period in her history which could not be
 “ recalled with pleasure, but that, ever since he himself had held
 “ the portfolio of foreign affairs, he had been desirous of an op-
 “ portunity to revise that whole treaty, in which the right of
 “ search was thus granted to Great Britain. The exercise of
 “ this right was vexatious, and besides, the English were always
 “ talking, in Parliament and out, of their having purchased this
 “ right of Spain for £40,000,* sterling money, always putting
 “ their money forward, and he (Mr. Calderon) would be exceed-
 “ ingly glad of an opportunity to give them their £40,000, and
 “ have the treaty back again. Mr. Calderon asked me if I sup-
 “ posed the recent treaty would be ratified by the American
 “ Senate. I replied to him that I had no reasonable doubt that
 “ it would be, and remarked that I supposed that England
 “ was now taking steps to obtain the same concession from
 “ the Government of France. Mr. Calderon said he had little
 “ doubt of it, but he wished to see the American treaty, as it
 “ might afford a basis for demanding a revision of the Spanish
 “ treaty, as to the manner in which this right was to be exer-
 “ cised. Though perhaps this conversation was not intended
 “ by Mr. Calderon to be reported to you, I have thought it
 “ interesting.”

This seems, naturally enough, to have irritated Mr. Seward, for, on the 2d August, he thus pettishly retorts, giving a fling at the Spanish authorities, which was neither discreet nor dignified.

“ Your despatch of July 11 (No. 69), has been received.
 “ The African slave trade, which has been so long clandestinely
 “ carried on from American ports, was a mercenary traffic,
 “ without even the poor pretext that it brought labourers into
 “ our country, or that other or worse pretext, that it was neces-
 “ sary to the safety or prosperity of any State or section. It
 “ was carried on in defiance of our laws, by corrupting the ad-

* So printed in these despatches. The sum was £400,000.

“ministration of justice. The treaty to which you refer contains no provisions that can embarrass an honest and lawful trade, and none that can inflict a wound upon the national pride. It was freely offered by this Government to Great Britain, *not bought*, or solicited by that Government. It is in harmony with the sentiments of the American people. It was ratified by the Senate unanimously, and afterward distinctly approved, with not less unanimity, by both Houses of Congress. Not a voice has been raised against it in the country. I send you a copy of it for Mr. Calderon, as you have requested.”

Thus, then, has Mr. Seward, without apparent compensation, bound all that is left of this Northern nation in chains, from which there is no peaceful escape. That there is not a secret history in this inexplicable transaction, an understanding of future sympathy and co-operation between the contracting parties, the Lincoln and Russell Governments, in case their tenure of power is prolonged, we are far from affirming. The suspicion, the fear, the hope—describe it as we may—that this sacrifice is not made in vain, and that the English administration may find it to be its interest to make this a substantial contract, by giving strength to the party who voluntarily tendered it, has more than once come like a dark shadow over us. An anti-slave-trade treaty with the North alone, would be the idlest of forms, except on the theory that, as heretofore, all the slave trading is to be carried on with Northern capital and in Northern bottoms. Then, it may be of value, even if the Southern Confederacy be established. Otherwise, it is, as we have said, utterly fruitless. Fruitless, we have it shown to be as to immediate results.

It was in this same month of March, that the administration assembled and brought into action all its diplomatic array abroad, regular and irregular. Not only were Mr. Weed and the Bishops on the spot, but, as this volume shows, other combinations were initiated.

The convocation of this new diplomatic Congress, was formally announced to our ministers abroad, who appear to have been confounded by the news. “When in November last,”

said Mr. Seward, "we thought we had reason to apprehend new and very serious dangers in Europe, the subject was taken into consideration by the President at a full meeting of the cabinet. It was understood that the insurgents were represented abroad, by a number of active, unscrupulous, and plausible men who manifestly were acquiring influence in society, and in the press, and employing it with dangerous effect, and it was thought that such efforts could be profitably counteracted by the presence in London and Paris of some loyal, high-spirited, and intellectual men, of social position and character. *We considered that the presence of such persons there, unless they should act with more discretion than we could confidently expect, would annoy, and possibly embarrass, our ministers abroad.* It was decided that hazard must be incurred in view of dangers which seemed imminent."

A better reason for *not* sending these semi-official agents abroad could hardly be given than in the lines we have ventured to italicise. So thought Mr. Adams, for we search this book in vain for any expression, on his part, of gratitude for the suggestion. Who the new agents were, does not appear in these despatches, though *aliunde*, we know all about them. The Bishops and Mr. Weed hurried to the rescue. The latter, the accredited friend, the almost partner of the Secretary of State, was received in England with great friendliness and apparent unreserve. He was the guest of Lady Russell, at Richmond Park, and duly wrote home letters, to be printed in the Albany Evening Journal, full of local gossip picked up in her drawing-room, and criticising the details of her household. Occasionally, his services were needed on a more public stage. Bishop McIlvaine, who seems to have been in the service of the administration from the time of his visit to England, until the adjournment of the triennial Convention in October, 1862, always active, meddlesome, intrusive, sometimes needed the assistance of his lay colleague, and we find that Mr. Weed, the conservative of 1863, was not far behind the most extreme anti-slavery propagandists, in the spring of 1862.

On the 3d February, 1862, Mr. Weed addressed a meet-

ing at No. 2 Pall, Mall, and, among other things, said : "As to the prospects of the future, the administration not only desired, but expected emancipation as the fruit and result of the war. Slavery was and would be burned out of every acre and rood of territory conquered from the rebels ; so that, by process of war and by legal enactment, if the United States Government were successful, slavery would cease to exist."*

Not content with Mr. Weed and the Prelates, Mr. Seward summoned Mr. Motley, from Vienna to London, to confer and co-operate with Mr. Adams.

And here, let us pause over another wreck of reputation which is seen through the haze of this official correspondence. Mr. John Lothrop Motley—not, as he tells us, the Emperor of Austria imagined (p. 557), "a German exile," but "a descendant of the early Pilgrims of New England," had, before he was tempted into diplomatic paths, a high position in American authorship. Justly or unjustly, he had gained a large share of favour on both sides of the Atlantic, and when his appointment to Austria was announced, those who were willing to judge Mr. Seward kindly were content to see a parallel to the case of Washington Irving, whom Mr. Webster sent as Minister to Spain years ago, and whose official action, while it involved no neglect of public interests or duties, was improved by labour in the cause of letters, far dearer to him than politics. But "the descendant of the early Pilgrims" could not, and, we are bound to say, does not seem to have tried to, repress the inherited and inherent fanaticism which seems to be interwoven with the heart-strings of New England. Before he was appointed, he wrote an essay for the *London Times* on the Constitution, of which it was justly said by an able critic : "That its melodramatic style prevails widely in the American press, and is well adapted to the condition to which it has reduced the American mind ; showing, as it does, how words may be made effective in clouding the mind, and how

* *London Record*, February 3 : In curious contrast with this harangue are Mr. Weed's palinodes of 1863. "If," said he, "the North rejected abolition as a merely political test, will it be accepted now, when the lives of our sons and brothers, and the preservation of the country are involved ! We ask this question now in view of the concerted effort to narrow this mighty struggle for national existence down to an abolition crusade."

sentiments may be boldly set side by side with facts which utterly belie them.”* Though startled by this, we were not prepared for such revelations of puerility and what we are tempted to call ‘snobbishness’ disclosed in the half-dozen despatches from Vienna which Mr. Seward has cruelly given to the world. We have neither room nor patience to consider them in detail, but beg the reader, who may, naturally enough, in view of Mr. Motley’s reputation, doubt the severe justice of our judgment, to examine for himself the despatch of November, 1861, narrating his reception by the Emperor, and the concluding one of October, 1862, in which, with a poor garniture of familiar quotations, and a dismal continuity of platitudes, he discusses the position and character of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, with whom, one would think, the Minister to Austria has no more concern than with the Rajah of Sarawak, and to whose speech at Manchester he applies the gentle and gentlemanly criticism: “Blistered be the tongue that speaks of shame is the only and fit response to such rhetoric and such prophecy as Mr. Gladstone’s.”

Why, with such antecedents, and circumstances, Mr. Motley was selected to go to London to help Mr. Adams would be a puzzle but for his assertion of his own fitness for the work. He is the “Mr. Lofty” of this diplomatic comedy. “I told Count Reçhberg that I had recently had a very long and full conversation with Lord John Russell, &c.” “I told him I had received similar assurances from other members of the English cabinet, &c.” “He asked me what I thought of the attitude of France, and I told him that M. Thouvenel had assured me, &c.,” and at last he winds up with a passage which we reproduce, as being as concentrated a specimen of egotism and official indiscretion as this volume contains.

“One thing is very certain. The Government here will be very much influenced by the course of policy pursued towards the United States by the British and French governments; and I am therefore glad that, in pursuance of your instruc-

* The Constitution and Mr. Motley, by Rowland E. Evans Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar. Philadelphia, 1861.

“ tions, I passed some time before coming to my post informing myself at the fountain heads, in England and France, of the probable nature of that policy. I am constantly questioned on the subject by all with whom I come in contact. Should a tory government succeed the present cabinet in England, I anticipate much trouble. Nothing can exceed the virulence with which the extreme conservative party regard us, nor the delight with which they look forward to our extinction as a nation. They consider such a consummation of our civil war as the most triumphant answer which could be made to their own reform party. The hatred to the English radicals is the secret of the ferocity and brutality with which the Times, the Saturday Review, and other tory organs of the press have poured out their insults upon America ever since the war began. In the present administration and its supporters, I know we have many warm friends, warmer in their sentiments towards us, than it would be safe for them, in the present state of parties, to avow.”

What, we may diffidently ask, will be thought of the propriety and expediency of publishing such a despatch as this, if, by any political accident, Lord Derby and “the extreme conservative party” should come into power?

Whether Mr. Motley did bring to Mr. Adams’ aid his familiar acquaintance with the leaders of British politics, does not appear very clearly, but whether he did or not, no result was attained. The aggregated influence of prelates and politicians in London availed naught. The ministry refused to recede a hair’s breadth from their recognition of the belligerent rights of the South. The Alabama and Oreto, and that unadjudicated craft, the Bermuda, sailed from Liverpool, destined for destructive war on Northern commerce. Strict port discipline watched the Tuscarora at Southampton, and a British frigate literally convoyed the Nashville to sea. The poor little Saginaw was ordered away from Hong Kong.* The Emily

* In April last, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams as to the “Chinese” Rebellion, a special despatch, which it would be unfair to suppress or mutilate. Its oddity, in view of everything at home and abroad, is superlative. “The re-

St. Pierre was not given up. The Bull Dog (p. 228) carried "one Pegram and seven other persons" to officer "290." In short, at the end of Mr. Seward's year, the curtain dropped on a scene of impotent diplomacy, which all his rhetoric cannot disguise. Mediation or intervention never was dreamed of in England; and the belligerent recognition, for the withdrawal of which there was so much fruitless urgency, remains in as full force as on the day it was announced. "How far," said Mr. Adams, in one of his latest letters, "the question of a recognition of the insurgents will enter into the deliberation (of Parliament), I will not venture to predict. My opinion is that that event now depends almost entirely on the fortune of the war. If we prove ourselves, *by February next*, no more able to control its results than we are at this moment, it will be difficult for ministers longer to resist the current of sentiment leading in that direction in both Houses of Parliament. Even the unpleasant alternative of appearing to uphold slavery against the action of the Government will be acquiesced in as an overruling necessity, dictated by the popular opinion. I feel it my duty to say this

ports we receive from China show that the insurrection there is becoming very formidable, and they leave it doubtful whether the British and French forces now in China are adequate to secure the inviolability of the persons and property of the subjects and citizens of the western powers dwelling in the commercial cities of that Empire. It is a matter of deep regret to us that our troubles at home render it hazardous to withdraw a part of our great land and naval forces from operating here, and send *them* to China to co-operate with the forces of the allies there. As you are well aware, the continuance of the insurrection in the United States is due to the attitudes of Great Britain and France towards our country. It would seem to be desirable for those two states to have our co-operation in China in preserving a commerce of vast importance to them as well as to ourselves. That co-operation we could give if we were relieved from the necessity for maintaining a blockade and seige of the Southern ports. Moreover, the question may be well asked, where is this tendency to insurrection, which Great Britain and France seem to us to be practically, although unintentionally, fostering, to end? It breaks out in the Levant; it grows flagrant on the China coasts; it even lifts up its head in France. Is it not the interest of all great maritime states to repress or at least to discourage it? The President does not expect you to make any special or formal suggestion of these views to the British Government, but it seems to him you may properly use them, incidentally, with advantage to your intercourse with the British Government and British society."

much, in order to prevent the smallest misconception of the existing state of things, on this side, in the minds of the Government at home."

If to be forewarned is to be forearmed, then, in the beginning of November, when this ominous despatch reached America, was the administration at Washington elad in proof; yet on the 10th of the same month, General McClellan was removed from his command and banished to the mild sympathies of New York and Boston, and the chapter of disaster opened, which seems to have closed, in bloody disappointment, on the heights of Fredericksburg, at Vicksburg, and in the doubtful struggle at Murfreesborough.

Turning to Mr. Seward's diplomacy in Paris, let us briefly and candidly state its course and its fruits. As tending to something like a result at the moment these lines are written, they are very important. In it, one thing is very manifest, that Mr. Dayton never enjoyed the same confidential and cordial relations to the Government at home as did Mr. Adams, or Mr. Motley, or even Mr. Pike, of the Tribune; and this, for no other apparent reason than, that a year ago, in the matter of the surrender of privateering, Mr. Dayton had proved not only that he had a will of his own, but that, when he yielded it to positive orders, he was right and the Government wrong.* There can

* The threat which, in July, 1862, was made towards England, in February 1863, is about to be aimed somewhere else. On the 17th instant, as these sheets are passing through the press, the Senate Bill authorizing privateers was dug from its forgotten grave and animated. It was passed in spite of the opposition of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs. No comment is needed on the following proceedings:

"Mr. McDougall said he especially wanted this bill passed, for he believed that before Congress met again, we should be at war with a foreign power, and should need all our force on sea and land.

"Mr. Sumner offered an amendment confining the operation of the bill to the suppression of the rebellion. He argued that we should not put anything in the bill like a menace. When we were engaged in a foreign war, then would be time enough to meet that question.

"Mr. McDougall asked the Senator, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, if we were not now threatened with foreign complications.

"Mr. Sumner said he had no information that was not open to the Senate.

"Mr. McDougall believed that before the meeting of another Congress we

hardly be conceived a position of greater embarrassment for an intelligent, patriotic and high spirited man, than that of Mr. Dayton, during the anxious and busy year just ended. Accredited to a court whose master prides himself on his demeanour of reserve, if not his policy of subtlety; opposed by what, abroad, is a vast power, social sympathy and antipathy; confronted by an able, astute, and, in his line of diplomacy, accomplished adversary; unfamiliar with the language of the refined and artificial society in which he was plunged; Mr. Dayton had, at least, a right to a thorough and cordial support at home, and to something more than a chilling and formal endorsement of his conduct. Mr. Seward was never wearied of sending honied compliments to Mr. Adams as to his ability, his sagacity, his discretion, his "far-reaching grasp" (p. 201). To his colleague in France he was far more sparing.

But Mr. Dayton laboured under another disadvantage which was radical. Representing a jealous, suspicious, irritable Government, impregnated thoroughly with the one idea of unity at any cost, and coercion to an illimitable extent—a Government which, whether right or wrong at the beginning, has learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and resents any different view of the circumstances which surround it, it was difficult, if not impossible, especially with the meagre information furnished him, to rise to the appreciation of fair play and really friendly

should be involved in a foreign war, and he wanted to have the country prepared.

"The amendment of Mr. Sumner was rejected—yeas 13, nays 22.

"MR. SUMNER offered an amendment as a substitute, reviving the acts of 1812 and 1813, concerning the letters of marque, and applying them to that portion of the United States in insurrection. Rejected.

"MR. SUMNER offered another amendment, as a substitute, authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to hire any vessels needed for the national service, putting them in charge of officers commissioned by the United States, and giving them the character of national ships. Rejected—yeas 8, nays 28.

"MR. DAVIS, of Kentucky, offered a substitute, authorizing the President to pay any vessel regularly put into commission three times the value of any ship or ships captured belonging to the States now in insurrection. Rejected."

The bill was then passed—yeas 27, nays 9—no Democratic Senator voting.

feeling on the part of the Government to which he was accredited. Yet such has been the conduct and temper—as the impartial world admits—of the French government from first to last—from the time when, long ago, M. Thouvenel, whom Mr. Dayton says was a friend, and whose displacement he regretted—gently hinted the possibility of the war becoming protracted and bloody, down to the last offer of friendly intervention, *pendente lite*, within the present month. This steady and considerate friendliness was disturbed by no hostile act—no departure from practical neutrality. No armed vessels left the ports of France—no contraband commodities were shipped thence. The indiscretions here, such as the ostentatious enlistment of the Orleans princes in the Federal army, or the welcome to the Conde de Reus after he had broken away from the French co-operation in Mexico, seemed to make no impression on the really friendly sentiment in France.* History has well settled the question, once agitated, of the good faith of the Bourbon dynasty to us in our time of early trouble. It must, we think, pronounce the same judgment on the doings of the dynasty of their imperial successor.

But Mr. Seward's Minister in Paris was not allowed to see this, or to act as if he even dreamed of it. The only really cordial and friendly despatch ever sent is one, suppressed in this collection, written in February, 1862, on the subject of Court

* The treatment of the Orleans young gentlemen seems to have attracted adverse criticism in France. Some time between the 13th and 23d of June, Mr. Dayton wrote a confidential despatch, (No. 164,) which is suppressed in this volume, but the answer shows to what it related. "The President appreciates the vigilance and the prudence which suggested your confidential despatch. It may be enough to say, in reply, that the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Chartres, after a year's service in the army of the United States, in which they have conducted themselves with the utmost propriety and the highest gallantry, have returned to Europe. It is not to be doubted that they carry with them the affectionate gratitude of the American people. This, however, is a sentiment won by them, not for themselves alone, or even peculiarly, but, as in the case of Lafayette and Rochambeau, it is a sentiment won by them for France." The analogy to Lafayette is not happy. The first battle in which he served on this soil was a defeat, not comparable in its bloodiness to some we have encountered, but still an appalling defeat. He did *not* return to France in the hour of disaster.

presentations at the Tuileries, in which, after saying that "it is peculiarly *uncomfortable* at the present moment to find American citizens leaving their country—a prey to factions and civil war—disturbing the Court of a friendly power and embarrassing our representative there with questions of personal interest and pretension; Mr. Seward adds quite sensibly, though with a stateliness of which he rarely divests himself, and at which, in connexion with the trivial topic of discussion, it is hardly possible not to smile:

"Let the Emperor and Empress of France receive when they will, and as many or few as they will, and let all others, as well as those who are admitted, turn their attention to the question how they can serve their country abroad; and if they find no better way to do it than by making their attendance in the saloons of the Tuileries, let them return home to a country that now, for the first time, and not for a long time, needs the active efforts of every one of its loyal children to save itself from destruction. Finally, above all things, have no question with the Government of France on this subject. Rather introduce nobody, however justly distinguished, than let a question of fashion or ceremony appear in the records of the important period in which we are acting for the highest interests of our country and of humanity."

No word of cordiality comparable to this, is to be found anywhere else. Mr. Dayton's situation was a difficult one, and Mr. Seward did nothing to render it less so. Sometimes he is—at least, so it seems to us, looking at these despatches in print—almost insulting, as, for instance, when, in March of last year, in answer to one in which Mr. Dayton felicitated himself on accidentally hearing the views of the administration "from the newspapers," the Secretary sends some meagre military news as to the operations against New Orleans, prefacing it with the conjecture: "*I suppose I hazard nothing of publicity here by informing you that General Butler, with an adequate land force, and Captain Porter, with a fleet, are already in motion to secure and hold New Orleans.*" It was about the same time that Mr. Dayton wrote about the cotton supply, and said: "Do not delay action, I beg of you, a day beyond the

time when you can act on this subject with propriety," and the answer was a cold, unsatisfactory one of eight lines, in sharp contrast with the pages the Secretary was writing to Mr. Adams, and Pike, and Cameron. Well might Mr. Dayton say, in reply, "I was a little surprised by the vague and general terms in which you expressed your intentions, and felt that the Government here would not consider them as explicit and satisfactory as those heretofore used." To this, or other despatches like this, the answer is stern and repulsive. "To bring the Emperor to this conviction is your present urgent duty. If successful in performing it, you will render a benefit to France worth more than any conquest, while you will direct a stream of healing oil upon the wounds of our afflicted land." To be thus reminded of one's duty, when conscious of performing it, is anything but agreeable.

In August, Mr. Dayton's sufferings became intolerable, and compelled him to send a despatch to Washington which tells its tale of suffering and injustice with an emphasis that, if anything could, must have made an impression:—

"It would seem to me that you must have some information, beyond what I receive here, as to the views of France, from her minister at Washington. If so, may I beg that you will communicate it? I am sure that I need not say that I ask this information from no idle curiosity, but as something essential to a useful discharge of my duties here. Nothing can be more embarrassing than being in the dark upon matters which may have transpired between yourself and the French minister at Washington. As an illustration of this, the only knowledge I had of the actual purpose of Mr. Mercier's recent visit to Richmond was obtained first from Lord Cowley, the British ambassador, and next, at second hand, from the Emperor. You will, under these circumstances, appreciate at once my embarrassments in falling into conversation with Lord Cowley on this subject. I make this reference, not at all as matter of complaint, but only as an illustration of my meaning, when I allude to embarrassments arising from a want of knowledge of what may have transpired, if anything, between yourself and Mr. Mercier. I know and fully appre-

“ciate the vast extent of your labors, and it may well be that
 “nothing has recently been communicated by the French gov-
 “ernment. If so, I beg that you will excuse me for directing
 “your attention to the subject.”

This was in August, and Mr. Mercier's visit to Richmond was in April; and though Mr. Dayton had been duly informed of his having gone, no word was ever sent to him as to why he had gone, or what was the result of his visit. Mr. Mercier, as we now know, wrote all about it to his government instantly on his return. Mr. Seward never told his representative abroad anything, till he supplicated for some information, and if he did afterwards, it is suppressed in this publication.

And why, let us here pause and ask, why this mystification on our side as to Mr. Mercier's visit to Richmond when there was none on the other—why was Mr. Dayton thus kept in the dark while the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was thoroughly well informed, and when the only thing the outside world knew was, that the instant the Gassendi brought the mysterious wayfarer back, the President and Mr. Seward rushed to the Navy Yard to greet her and find out all they could?* These questions are more easily answered now than they could have been a fortnight ago before copies of the “*Livre Jaune*” reached this country.

The truth we take to be that, among Mr. Seward's virtues, is not silence. He talks, we imagine, as fluently as he writes, and probably with no greater precision. If Mr. Wendell Phillips is to be credited, and on matters of fact, we know no reason that he should not be, Mr. Seward, before his accession to office, talked Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of State into a sort of confidence, that he was, and meant to be, a conservative and Constitution-respecting man, and yet it is to be doubted if he remembers anything about it now. So, we imagine, with Mr. Mercier, for on no other principle can we account for the pal-

* In curious and impressive contrast with this almost boisterous welcome, was the austere reserve of the Confederate Executive to Mr. Mercier. “N'ayant pas cru devoir demander à voir le Président Davis, il ne m'a été fait, à ce sujet, aucune insinuation, non plus que le moindre effort pour donner à ma présence une autre signification que celle qu'elle avoit réellement.”

pable difference of recollection between the two witnesses who have recently been upon the stand, and whose testimony, in no uncharitable spirit, we parallelize :

Mr. Mercier to Mr. Thouvenel, April 13th, 1862.

"Mr. Seward told me that I might add, if I found an opportune occasion, that according to his convictions, the North was animated by no spirit of revenge, and that, for himself, he would be most happy to find himself again in the Senate with all those the South might choose to send there.

"I undertook this journey (to Richmond) with the explicit acquiescence of the Secretary of State, and, as it seemed to me, according to his desire."

Mr. Seward to the President, February 9th, 1863.

"No suggestions were made to M. Mercier, by the Secretary of State, that induced or were designed or calculated to induce him to undertake a mission to Richmond in April last, or at any other time. He was not then, nor has he or any other person ever been authorized by this Government or by the Secretary of State to make any representations of any kind or on any subject to the insurrectionary agents or so-called authorities at Richmond, or to hold any communication with them on behalf of this Government."

* * * * *

"Since the 4th of March, 1861, no communication, direct or indirect, formal or informal, has been had by this Government or by the Secretary of State with the insurgents, their aiders or abettors."

* * * * *

"Passports were granted at the request of those distinguished persons respectively, and not on any suggestion of the Government or Secretary of State. They severally travelled in a private and unofficial capacity. They bore no communication, whether formal or informal, verbal or written, from this Government or from the Secretary of State to any of the insurgents, and they brought none from any such persons to this Government or to the Secretary of State."

We cannot but think that the suppressed passages of Mr. Seward's despatch, of the 23d of August, in answer to Mr. Dayton's supplication for light as to Mr. Mercier's visit to Richmond might illustrate this problem, and give us Mr. Seward's version of his interviews, written at a time when the radical opposition of his own party was not threatening him ;

and Lord Lyons must know what Mr. Mercier told him at the time of the conferences.

But let us hasten on to the closing scene of this busy year as it is revealed, not only in these papers, but in those which have been more recently given to the world on both sides of the Atlantic. It is full of interest.

The clouds began to gather in France as early as October, when M. Thouvenel was superseded, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys came into office. Mr. Dayton saw the significance of this. "We lose a friend," said he, "at an important point," and one cannot but smile at the meagre consolation that he finds, in the fact artlessly and honestly stated, that (speaking of M. Drouyn de Lhuys) "his perfect knowledge of our language will, to a certain extent, facilitate our official intercourse." The President's proclamation reached Paris soon after, accompanied by a most remarkable minatory despatch from Mr. Seward, and was communicated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who simply said, that "ours was a great question, and that he should endeavour to study it as soon as possible." This was on the 21st of October; and, in nine days from that date, having, it is to be supposed, mastered "the great question," M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote his despatch to the English and Russian cabinets, asking them to unite in an offer of friendly introduction with a view to an armistice. This important step does not appear to have been known to Mr. Dayton till after the 6th, for, on that day, he sends an account of a conference he had had with the French Minister, who told him "that everything remained as it had done for some time past. That France, in common with the other powers of Europe, very much regretted the war and its continuance, but that they had no purpose to intervene or interfere in any way." How far this is consistent with perfect candour, or how far a public man is bound to reveal to a party in interest, the fact of the mere initiation of a correspondence is a question we do not feel competent to decide. Mr. Seward, anxious enough to find ground of censure, does not seem to have found fault with it, but puts his complaint on what seems to us, and will seem to Europe, the strange ground, that the action of the Great Powers "was a conference"—"an

inconclusive conference" he calls it—to which the United States should have been invited.

But Mr. Seward and the Cabinet at Washington found it easier and safer to condemn their own Minister than to resent anything that France might do; and, accordingly, the papers recently volunteered to the public and which, by-the-by, were not given, until the contents of the "Livre Jaune" reached this country and rendered our 'Premier's' tenure of office and influence precarious—these papers reveal an act of injustice to a distant and patriotic public servant, which it is due to common fair play to expose and condemn. If Mr. Dayton were within reach, it looks as if Mr. Holt and the Government detectives might be directed against him, and, as if the Administration were glad of a chance to rebuke him for his refractoriness a year ago on the private war question; or to verify the threat which has been attributed to Mr. Lincoln, that, as New Jersey had never done anything for him, he would take the first chance to punish New Jersey.

What is Mr. Dayton's offence, that called for Secretary Seward's rebuke? On the 6th of November, as we have seen, he knew nothing of the Armistice proposition. He did know of it, however, before the 16th, for, on that day, he wrote a remonstrance—earnest, respectful, confident, though ineffectual remonstrance—directed mainly to convince the French minister that he was mistaken in supposing that there was, or ever had been, an equality of strength between the contending forces here, or that, "after so much bloodshed, they are now in the same position as at first." There was but one phrase in this letter, which, by possibility, could give offence at Washington. It was that in which Mr. Dayton did some sort of justice to the valour of the confederates. "In Virginia," said he, "the insurgents have advanced and retreated. They have gained battles and have lost them. I do not mean to depreciate their gallantry; *they are yet my countrymen*, and here, at least, they have shown equality of strength."

When this despatch reached the State Department, we were on the eve of the hideous sacrifice at Fredericksburg, when the Administration knew they were pursuing a course which involved terrible hazard, and when it was "treasonable" to

admit even to themselves, that, in Virginia, there had been, and might be, again "equality of strength."* The Presidential orders had been issued to make the bloody experiment against the frowning batteries which overlooked the Rappahannock. The Cabinet was anxious and irritable. Mr. Dayton had written a despatch on the 10th of November, *which has not been printed*, and which contained evidently some exasperating hint, or some annoying inquiry as to what had been said to Mr. Mercier, or what Mr. Mercier had been authorized to say. It was a subject on which Mr. Seward was nervous, and he writes:—

"In reply to a suggestion in your despatch, it is proper for me to say that neither M. Mercier nor any other person has had the least warrant from any authority of the United States for representing to his Government that the President would be disposed to entertain any proposition in regard to the action of this Government in the conduct of our domestic affairs from any foreign quarter whatsoever. The exact contrary is, in effect, all that has ever passed between all the ministers residing here and this department. You will judge whether it is important to clear up this point at Paris."

On, or immediately before the 5th of December, Mr. Dayton's remonstrance and argument against the French project arrived, and Mr. Seward, as if angry that anybody but himself should argue, or prophecy, or "discourse,"† sends a despatch to Mr. Dayton, the import of which cannot be mistaken:—

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, }
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5th, 1862. }

SIR: Your despatch of Nov. 18, No. 227, has been received. Having already indicated the course which the President has decided to adopt concerning the late proceedings of the French

* As to Fredericksburg, there is in General Hooker's testimony before the Senate Committee the following inexplicable passage: "It was just dark. Finding I had lost as many men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack."—Senate Document No. 71, page 25.

† "I do not discourse to-day upon the military position."—Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, page 379.

government, it is not necessary now for me to review the note which, *in the absence of instructions*, you have written to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. SEWARD.

And, on the 11th, he repeats this reprimand, showing that, had the French answer been other than it was, the language of rebuke would have been still stronger :—

“ From my previous despatches you will probably have inferred that the President *did not expect you to open a correspondence with M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the subject of the proposition concerning American affairs, which the Emperor has recently submitted to the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of Great Britain. Insomuch as you have done so without consulting this government*, and have thus drawn forth from the imperial government a frank and friendly answer, it is only proper that you should now inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that his note has been submitted to the President, and that he is gratified with the explanations it gives of the present policy of the Emperor in regard to the United States.”

With Mr. Dayton's manly and earnest reply, which shows how deeply he felt the wrong that had been done, this chapter of mismanaged statesmanship may be said to close:—

“ PARIS, December 23, 1862.

“ SIR: Your despatch of December 5, No. 265, is received. You simply acknowledge the receipt of my despatch of November 18, No. 227, and say that, ‘having already indicated the course which the President has decided to adopt concerning the late proceedings of the French government, it is unnecessary for me to review the note, which, *in the absence of instructions*, you (I) have written to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.’ I had supposed that that note, as it did not assume to indicate any policy, but merely to sum up briefly the successes of our army and the governmental resources, in hopes of its having weight in any future deliberation of this government, could not fail at least to meet the approbation of the department. My general instructions in reference to the subject-matter were most ample, and I had held verbal con-

“ference with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject before. He
 “told me what he had done; and I could answer when, perhaps,
 “the government could not. The emergency, I thought, not
 “only justified, but required, that in view of the possible future,
 “I should put my verbal suggestions in writing. As one useful
 “result, at all events, I have received the important communi-
 “cations of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of November 23d last, a
 “copy of which accompanied my despatch, No. 231. I may
 “add, also, that I felt that it was but just to myself that my
 “countrymen, as well as the government, should see and know
 “that I had not failed, in the crisis which had occurred, fairly
 “to represent its condition.

“I am, sir, your obedient servant,
 WM. L. DAYTON.”

Nothing now remains but a sort of postscript of negotiations or correspondence, the interest and import of which cannot be measured till we have the news of the manner, in which it is received on the other side of the Atlantic; Mr. Seward's last published despatch to Mr. Dayton, of the 6th of February, being now on the ocean, having been printed before it was sent to its destination. Its issue is quite as momentous as was the undecided question of the Trent.

The reader of these pages must have seen the clear conviction under which they are written, that the action of the French Government from first to last, with perhaps one exception, has been candid, entirely ingenuous and friendly. No credit perhaps is due for this, for the interest France has in the integrity and welfare of the United States, as they once were, is palpable. We believe M. Drouyn de Lhuys said the actual truth when he wrote: “I assure you that our friendly dispositions have not changed. If, some day, the Americans, tired of turning their valor against themselves, should wish to have recourse to us, in order to seek, in concert, the means of terminating this conflict they would find us always ready, associated with other powers or separately, to aid them with our co-operation, and to testify by our good offices, the feelings which have not ceased to animate France in regard to them.” But it is also apparent, that the Lincoln Government, as represented and controlled by Mr. Seward, never thought so, or if they did,

have never been able so far to reconcile it with their poor notions of policy and their craven fears of the radical element, as to be willing to say so.

It is impossible to regard the decision on the last French proposition of a negotiation, pending hostilities, in any other light, or to think of it, without a just solicitude as to the possible consequences of a refusal to listen to the voice of friendly counsel, its object being peace—peace among brethren, “for such,” says Mr. Dayton, “we yet are,” peace in an agonized and bloodstained land—peace with the chances of seeing a restoration on this continent, of great commonwealths, which may raise the American name and prowess from the abyss in which they have now sunk. One of two consequences, it requires no skill of prophesy to know, must follow—that France (and with it the other great powers,) wearied of the material sacrifices they have been making, and angered at the obduracy with which all intercession is rejected, may recognize the Southern Confederacy, and give it the vast moral support which mere recognition will confer—or that, weariness and disgust taking another course, they may leave us to the arbitrament which we have chosen, and which no human power, no course of events, no success, no disappointment, induces us to relinquish.

Why, but for motives purely personal and having reference to the microcosm of small politics, in which he has always moved, Mr. Seward should have rudely refused to listen to the counsel, for it was nothing more, and not intervention nor mediation, of the French Government, it is difficult to understand. One may imagine, indeed, how it might have been turned to the prejudice of the Confederates, if *they* had declined to accede to it. It is difficult to see any reason for our refusing it. Still it has been refused, and we must abide the issue, as we did that of the Trent retraction, with deep solicitude, and, as Mr. Seward hopes, no doubt, with a readiness, should no evil result follow, to claim it as a new diplomatic triumph.

Were it not a subject so full of gravity in every respect it would not be unprofitable, before the judgment of what Mr. Seward somewhere, in truly Chinese style, calls “the outside world,” is known, to look at it critically, for the conduct of the whole affair is very characteristic. Mr. Dayton communicated

the fact that the Emperor meant to offer his friendly counsel, in a note, made very laconic by his sense of recent injury. The counsel was offered on the 3d of the present month, in language, the friendly, deferential tone of which could not be surpassed. Commissioners were to be named, privately and informally, if need be. They were to meet—that is, if both belligerents agreed, and if they did not, the advantage enured to the one who did, and, in the language of the French despatch, which to our ears, sounds like the accents of a kind and anxious friend:

“In place of the accusations which North and South mutually cast upon each other at this time, would be substituted an argumentative discussion of the interests which divide them. They would seek out, by means of well-ordered and profound deliberations, whether these interests are definitively irreconcilable, whether separation is an extreme which can no longer be avoided, or whether the memories of common existence, whether the ties of any kind which have made of the North and of the South one sole and whole fédérative state, and have borne them on to so high a degree of prosperity, are not more powerful than the causes which have placed arms in the hands of the two populations.”

To this counsel, in three days, Mr. Seward sent his answer of denial. It is but fair to say that his attitude, relatively to his own party just now, is not favourable to repose, or deliberation, or conciliatory action. The temptation to be exacting and repellant, and denunciatory is very great at this moment. It has not been resisted. The answer is dated on the 6th, and was, as we have said, instantly published. It has all the marked peculiarities of Mr. Seward's rhetoric. No one else on the roll of statesmen, or of such as claim to be statesmen, would venture at this moment of anxious suspense to say, as he does, that the Federal Government now holds half of North Carolina and Mississippi, and one-third of South Carolina!* No one but

* The official paper at Washington, which prints “from the original in the State Department,” makes, on this extraordinary statement, the following just comment: “Accustomed as we have been to the complaints of factious politicians, this brief retrospect of our Army and Navy will only surprise the American people less than the great Power for whose benefit it is made.”—Chronicle, February 14th, 1862.

Mr. Seward would insinuate to a courteous correspondent that he had, to use his peculiar words, "taken other light" to guide his footsteps than such as was radiated from his Department, or would, all things considered, be surprised if he had. No one else would have described the people of this country "as a Peace Democracy." No one but Mr. Seward would venture to say, and hope to be believed, "that our credit is adequate to the existing emergency," or would at this time of day, revive the cant of 'loyal men in the South' represented in Congress, the representatives being refugees elected by military authority,—and, least of all, no one, we are very sure, but Mr. Seward, would meet the the practical, and if not practical, perfectly intelligible, suggestion of a commission on neutral ground, with what we can construe in no other way than the poor sarcasm of saying that the Congress of the United States is the proper "forum for debates between alienated parties," whose "vacant seats are inviting back the Senators and Representatives of the discontented." Whether the force and point of this sarcasm will be appreciated by the Imperial councils, we do not pretend to conjecture. Mr. Dayton, in one of his moments of despondency last summer, well said: "At a court where there is a power—a *thinking, acting power*—behind the ministry, we can never feel quite sure of our position; and it is on the decision of that power, when he shall have received Mr. Seward's rebuke, that more depends than can be easily measured. As we have said, action and inaction are alike portentous.

The deep interest of these later revelations has led us away from the immediate subject of review, and having exhausted our space, we shall not recur to it. Attention has been naturally directed to Mr. Seward's "diplomacy" with the two leading foreign powers, but there is a vast fund beside, on which we have not drawn. The correspondence with Russia, whence Mr. Clay wrote (and Mr. Seward prints) that "money and men should be sent into Ireland, India, and all the British dominions, all over the world, to stir up revolt; for our cause is just, and vengeance will sooner or later overtake that perfidious aristocracy;" and Mr. Cameron informed the government that "the fountains of Peterhoff were set in operation and a sumptuous dinner provided" for his benefit; and Prince Gortachow told Mr. Taylor, as late as October: "Your situation is getting worse and worse.

The chances of preserving the Union are growing more and more desperate. Can nothing be done to stop this dreadful war?"—is very suggestive. So is that with Spain, and Mexico, where Mr. Corwin amused himself with making treaties which were rejected, and the Mexicans, on the faith of them, drawing bills which were protested; and Prussia, and Holland, and Japan, and China—and the Central American States, who rose as one man against Mr. Lincoln's negro deportation scheme, and, as our ministers said, "regarded it as the greatest degradation for the country to be overrun with blacks" (p. 891,) or "to be visited by a plague of which the United States desired to rid themselves." (p. 900.) Morocco, where a consul with a guard of Moors captured an officer of the Sumter, and a Southern traveller, and sent them home in irons, to be discharged or exchanged as prisoners of war, is a curious chapter; and most curious and discreditable of all is that of Brazil, where Mr. Webb insisted on making, at his reception, "a longer speech" than his predecessor, and whose style of writing to his Government and mode of diplomatic action, may be judged of by the following passage from one of his despatches to Mr. Seward:

"Robert G. Smith, our late consul, was an open-mouthed traitor and a loud talker. He said, on different occasions, "Meade is the greatest traitor of the two, and if he ever gets back to Virginia, it will be in consequence of his disguising himself." He said *he* dared not show himself in New York or any Northern State; and finally left here with his wife, who is from Maine, in an English ship for Liverpool. My impression is, that he has sailed for Quebec under a feigned name, and if at the North, he is doubtless somewhere in the vicinity of his wife's relations. It is fortunate for him that he is not here, as he would unquestionably find himself a passenger on board a coffee ship bound for New York, and under command of a loyal shipmaster, as there would be no difficulty in sending the traitors home without coming in collision with the Brazilian authorities. Our consul reports that a very decidedly better feeling exists among all Americans here, and that the oath of allegiance is cheerfully taken by nine-tenths of the shipmasters, while even those of rebel proclivities admit its justice, and, after making wry faces, take the oath sooner

“ than be refused their papers. Some of them had sworn roundly that they never would take the oath prescribed; and it is a matter of great exultation and pride with the loyal masters to perceive how thoroughly the blusterers, who boasted of their secession propensities and their secession flags, have been humbled before the authority of the United States Government exercised in the most quiet way possible.”

This review is closed in a spirit not more cheerful than that in which it was begun. If the civil war, in which Providence, for our national wrong-doings, has plunged us, had, in its fearful processes, evolved one master-spirit—one great man, Soldier or Statesman, on whom, as the darkness and the danger grew, the hope of the nation might rest, and who should seem to be able to lead us out of the labyrinth in which we are condemned to wander, there would be a sort of consolation. But mediocrity, or less than mediocrity, reigns everywhere. It is the time and the scene of shallow—half-educated, light-minded men in executive council. Day after day rolls on, and the hideous monotony of blood is only varied by revelations of corruption and speculation in places high and low—from the gigantic contractors of unseaworthy fleets down to the colonel who cheats the Government by forging dead soldiers’ names. Fierce fanaticism has full sway in the cabinet and out of it. It seems to be the only positive principle; and before it, the Constitution and its guarantees have been broken down. For this conquest—for this triumph of lawless power over constitutional right—for this connivance against knowledge in the imagined exigencies of the times to overthrow the law—for the unlawful arrests and cruel imprisonments that have been perpetrated and are yet justified—for the foreign policy of the Government, which, as we have tried to show, has gained nothing and sacrificed everything, and, has now brought us back to where we were little more than a year ago—a position of anxious dependence on the will of strangers—for all this, no one, in our poor judgment, is more responsible than the public man whose writings we have endeavoured fairly to review; and who now, unless rumor be utterly false, distrusted and proscribed by the radicals of his own party, is seeking to be the leader, in conjunction with the kindred

spirits who have always clustered round him, in a new Pseudo-Conservative party, who imagine they can restore to life the Union which they have stabbed, and the Constitution they have violated. The quotation is trite, but it has an actual truth, even in its misapplication:—

“ Non tali auxilio,—nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget.”

The Ship of State is among the reefs and breakers, with gloom and danger threatening outside. The pilot to weather the storm is not among those on deck. The hands that steered it into peril cannot be trusted for rescue—the chief mate least of all.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the first edition of this pamphlet appeared, the Parliamentary Papers on American affairs, as well as the '*Livre Jaune*,' have reached this country. They fully confirm the views stated in the preceding pages, of the impotent diplomacy of our Foreign Secretary. They show much more. They show that, while no act of wrong or word of unkindness is attributable to the French Government or people, every page of Mr. Seward's and Earl Russell's correspondence, is disfigured by sternness, if not ill nature, on one part, and tame submissiveness on the other. The proof of this is abundant, and where positive evidence is wanting of words of offence being directly communicated to Mr. Seward, the official and voluntary publication of these Parliamentary papers, has now brought them and their revelations to his notice, and, if he ever troubles himself about such serious things, to that of Mr. Lincoln. It will cost little trouble to demonstrate this.

The negociation between Mr. Seward and the English and French ministers, as to an outlet for cotton, is a sad one, because it not only proves an apparent want of directness and candor, or the absence of influence in the cabinet, but it shows that such deficiencies were at once detected, and cautiously guarded against. This is summed up in one sentence from Lord Lyons' despatch of the 19th December last; "Mr. Seward observed with regard to my first question that neutral property was guaranteed by assurances given over and over again by this Government. To the second question, General Butler's proclamation would, he said, be a sufficient answer; but the case might now be altered, for General Banks had probably, by this time, super-

seded General Butler, and the new plan might have been put in force. I communicated to Mr. Mercier what Mr. Seward had said, and after some consideration we came to the conclusion that the only thing which would have any chance of being attended with a practical result would be to endeavour to obtain from Mr. Seward *some assurance in writing*. On reflection, I became convinced that a mere informal declaration from Mr. Seward would not be sufficient. I could not feel sure that such a document would be held to be binding by all the departments of the government. I remembered with regard to the proclamation of General Butler, on which Mr. Seward laid so much stress, that at the very moment, at which Mr. Seward had accepted from Mr. Stuart compliments on this proclamation, orders had, without his knowledge, been issued, which rendered the concessions made by it altogether inoperative in practice. I came therefore to the conclusion that nothing would be gained unless I procured a regular formal document from the whole government."

This is disparaging enough, but it is not all.

It is, as has been said, not easy to determine which part of the contents of these despatches was communicated to the Secretary of State. Some of them, probably were not, but the publication is, as lawyers say, notice to all the world, Mr. Seward included, of what the British Government had been doing, and thinking, and writing. When, therefore, Lord Lyons in his despatch of the 17th of November, (to which so much absurd criticism has lately been directed,) used the language we are about to quote, he revealed an inner truth which, now that it is authoritatively disclosed, must grate harshly upon the callous nerves of the federal administration, one and all.

"The experience of the past is certainly not calculated to inspire any great confidence in the results of these warlike preparations, but the political interests of the party now in power render a continuance of the war a necessity to it. Its only chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in successful military operations. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public estimation than it now occupies, not only will its tenure become extremely precarious, but some of its leading members may be called to a severe account for their extra-legal proceedings."

Lord Lyons was writing dismal truth. But this is not all.

As far back as August, 1862, the Chargé *ad interim*, Mr. Stuart, wrote (and the letter is published!) in relation to the passport system :

“ Whatever may be the amount of private dismay and inconvenience occasioned by these orders, they have been received by the press with the usual approbation given to arbitrary acts during this war.”

Nor is this all. On the 26th of September, Mr. Stuart wrote a despatch, (and this is published!) in reference to the executive suspension of the Habeas Corpus :

“ It may be said to place the whole nation under martial law. Personal liberty will now only exist by military sufferance. Your Lordship will observe that there is no law quoted in justification of this unprecedented usurpation of power, except that of a so-called necessity. The nation has shown itself so little jealous of its liberties during the past months, that the proclamation will probably be accepted with submission as an essential act of vigor for the successful prosecution of the war.”

Nor is this all. On the 7th of November, after the New York election, Mr. Stuart wrote (and this too is published!)—

“ The gains of the Democratic party have been so great that they are considered to constitute a political revolution. The extreme and unconstitutional policy of the government has no doubt been the principal cause of this general change of feelings, —either inflicting injury or spreading terror through the country, without producing any equivalent success in the conduct of the war. * * * I may add that disgust with the war and desire for peace has been amongst the principal causes, subordinate only to the policy of which they are the effect, of the present conservative resurrection.”*

The retention of office by Mr. Seward and his associates, one would think, poorly compensates for the humiliation of being thus made conscious that, in the judgment of the representatives of the nation to which they have surrendered every thing, the effect of their policy is ‘disgust.’

* In the Blue Book No. 1, p. 37, is Earl Russell's entire approval of Mr. Stuart's acts and correspondence; approval of his “temper, discretion and judgment.”

On the 21st of July 1862, the British Chargé wrote an account of a conversation he had had with the Secretary, who was in buoyant spirits, his wonderful elasticity showing itself even in the dreary interval between McClellan's retreat and Pope's discomfiture. "It would be" so Mr. Stuart reports Mr. Seward to say, "sufficient to have captured the ports and collect customs, to hold the Mississippi and the other navigable rivers, and to occupy certain strategic points, and that this done, the Southern States might well be left to themselves. Some six or nine months would probably be sufficient to bring them to reason." And then Mr. Stuart adds, as if part of the same executive revelation, "Amongst the means relied upon for weakening the South, is included a servile war."

It would be dismal work to turn back to the newspapers of last July, then, as still, the organs of the government, and the deputy despots of the land, but it may be assumed that no such fearful whisper as this, of a bloody intention to excite a servile revolt in the Southern States, as a mode of depleting them when left to themselves, had been given to the American public. Mr. Seward, in a despatch of which he was very proud (*Despatches*, 1862, pp. 105, 124), had himself deplored servile war "as productive of infinite suffering throughout the world," and yet here he was, if Mr. Stuart tells the truth, as we doubt not he does, hinting it coolly to a stranger, and that stranger, as was his duty, reporting it to his government. Let us see what was the reward,—a despatch from Earl Russell to Mr. Stuart, written instantly,—but three days elapsing,—on the receipt of this ominous hint; in which no notice whatever is taken of Mr. Seward's prophecies of success. The few words of the despatch are these:

"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 7, 1862.

"SIR: With reference to the paragraph in your despatch of the 21st ultimo, in which you say that a servile war is included in the means relied upon for weakening the South, I have to observe that the prospect of a servile war will only make other nations more desirous to see an end of the desolating and destructive conflict.

I am, &c.,

To Mr. Stuart.

RUSSELL."

The history of diplomacy affords no stronger specimen of stern rebuke than these few lines, from one who, without offence or inaccuracy, may be described as an anti-slavery statesman of the strictest school.*

Nor was this language of asperity directed only to Mr. Seward. Mr. Adams had his full share of it. On the 20th of November he made an earnest and elaborate complaint as to the 'Alabama,' to which Earl Russell replied, a month later—using, *inter alia*, these words, which it is quite needless for us to characterize.

“If it be sought to make her Majesty’s Government responsible to that of the United States, because arms and munitions of war have left this country on account of the Confederate Government; that Confederate Government, as the other belligerent, may very well maintain that it has a just cause of complaint against the British Government, because the United States Arsenals had been replenished from British sources. Nor would it be possible to deny, that, in defiance of the Queen’s Proclamation, many subjects of Her Majesty, owing allegiance to her crown, have enlisted in the armies of the United States. Of this fact you cannot be ignorant. Her Majesty’s Government therefore have just grounds of complaint against both of the belligerent parties, but most especially against the Government of the United States, for having systematically, and in disregard of that comity of nations, which it was their duty to observe, induced subjects of Her Majesty to violate those orders

* So, seem to think all the leading men of this school. On the Emancipation Proclamation appearing, Sir T. Fowell Buxton wrote to the *Evening Mail*:—“In your paper of to-day you ask “whether the sons of Wilberforce and of Buxton, who have all been brought up in the teaching of their fathers, now share the opinions of the present Emancipation Society as to the Proclamation of Mr. Lincoln.”

If the Proclamation means anything—if it is not a dead letter—it means to attack the weak point of the South by exciting an insurrection among the slaves—an insurrection which would commence by producing untold misery to many isolated families of whites, and would inevitably end in a wholesale massacre of the unarmed, ill-organized, ignorant negroes. Can you seriously ask whether the sons of Wilberforce and of Buxton approve this?

In the cause of the negro himself, I cannot regard with approval the act of Mr. Lincoln, which, if effective, must bring about “so horrible a termination of slavery” as a servile war.”

which in conformity with her neutral position she has enjoined all her subjects to obey."

This, however, was guarded and moderate language compared with the last extract from this part of the dreary correspondence which we have temper and patience to make. Especially is attention called to the final question addressed by Earl Russell to the representative of the once proud United States.

"I must ask first," says Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, "What are the circumstances within the control of the Government, to which you allude? Do you mean that Her Majesty's Government, in construing a penal statute, or in carrying into effect the provisions of a penal statute, should hurry at once to a decision, and seize a ship, building and fitting out at Liverpool, without being satisfied by evidence, that the provisions of the foreign enlistment act had been violated in the case of such vessel? Do you mean that Her Majesty's Government should dispense with proof and inflict injury upon the Queen's subjects, by seizing a ship, upon your mere assertion that the owners of the ship were violating the law! If such is your meaning, I must reply that the Government of this country respect the law. They do not seize upon property, to the loss and damage of its owners, without proof that they are legally entitled to do so. Perhaps your meaning is that Her Majesty's Government should have proceeded on the opinion of Mr. Collyer without waiting for other authority. But here again I must reply that the usage of this country requires that the Government should consult their own legal advisers, and obtain the opinion of the law officers of the crown, before they proceed to enforce a penal statute. If you mean to contend, therefore, that a nation in a state of profound peace, should set aside the formalities of law, and act at once upon presumptions and surmises, I entirely differ from you. * * * *

"If you mean that her Majesty's Government wilfully delayed or neglected the measures by which the character of the Alabama could have been legally ascertained, I must give a positive and complete denial of the truth of any such assertion."

Turning again to this side of the Atlantic—one hardly knows whether to smile or blush at the equanimity—almost frivolity, (for inappropriate jocularity seems to infect the whole Govern-

ment) with which an American Prime Minister accepts a sneer at the hands of one whom he dares not offend. Let the extracts speak for themselves :

“Mr. Seward,” wrote Lord Lyons on the 2d December, “without my having in any way led to the subject, spoke to me yesterday of the proposal made by France to Great Britain and Russia, to unite in advising the belligerents in this country to agree to an armistice. He said that he perceived that some of the European powers, all professing the most friendly feelings to this country, had been discussing its affairs amongst themselves, without taking the cabinet of Washington into their councils. However, as no official communication had been made to this Government, it was not called upon to give any opinion, or to say what it should or should not have done, if any proposal had been made to it. If any of the European powers concerned, should offer explanations on the subject, this Government would receive them respectfully, but would not be disposed to express any opinion on them.”

On the 19th, Earl Russell replied :—

“I have received your lordship’s despatch of the 2d instant, and with respect to Mr. Seward’s remarks, unprovoked on your part, that he perceived that some of the European powers, all professing the most friendly feelings to the United States, had been discussing its affairs amongst themselves, without taking the cabinet of Washington into their councils, I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of observing to Mr. Seward, that, without taking other reasons into consideration, the perusal of the accounts of the distress in Lancashire, owing to the want of cotton, which he will find in all the newspapers, will furnish him with reason enough for the discussion of American affairs in Europe. Great numbers of Her Majesty’s subjects are suffering severe distress in consequence of the belligerent operations of the cabinet at Washington.”

Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, January 7th, 1863 :—

“In obedience to your lordship’s orders, I, this morning, took an opportunity of observing that without taking other reasons into consideration, the accounts of the distress in Lancashire, would furnish him with reason enough for the discussion of American affairs in Europe.

"Mr. Seward *took the observation in very good part*, and said that the distress of the operatives in Europe was, indeed, a most painful subject of reflection!"

Our last citation refers not to the Secretary, but to Mr. Lincoln himself. There is in it a force of truthfulness which expiates the blow.

"The Proclamation," writes Lord Russell, on the 17th January, 1863, "of the President of the United States, enclosed in your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, appears to be of a very strange nature. It professes to emancipate all slaves in places where the United States authorities cannot exercise any jurisdiction, nor make emancipation a reality, but it does not decree emancipation of slaves in any States or parts of States occupied by Federal troops, and subject to United States jurisdiction, and where, therefore, emancipation, if decreed, might have been carried into effect. It would seem to follow, that in the Border States, and also in New Orleans, a slave-owner may recover his fugitive slave by the ordinary process of law; but that in the ten States in which the Proclamation decrees emancipation, a fugitive slave, arrested by legal warrant, may resist and his resistance, if successful, is to be upheld and aided by the United States authorities and the United States armed forces.

"The Proclamation therefore makes slavery at once legal and illegal, and makes slaves either punishable for running away from their masters, or entitled to be supported and encouraged in so doing, according to the locality of the plantation to which they belong, and the loyalty of the State in which they may happen to be.

"There seems to be no declaration of a principle adverse to slavery in this Proclamation. It is a measure of war, and a measure of war of a very questionable kind.

"As President Lincoln has twice appealed to the judgment of mankind in his Proclamation, I venture to say I do not think it can, or ought to satisfy the friends of abolition, who look for total and impartial freedom for the slave, and not for vengeance on the slave-owner."

And now our limits are exhausted, and allow room for but a single comment. That the correspondence of the French Minister with his Government does not contain equally dis-

paraging comments on our domestic and foreign policy, the writer is far from affirming. They have not however been given to the world; for the 'Livre Jaune' is searched in vain for an unkind word, or the shadow of a sneer, or a rebuke. Yet to France, the tone of Mr. Seward and his satellites has been almost defiant. The policy of the Executive in its welcome to the Orleans adventurers, (who have gone home to patronize Mr. Kinglake,) has been offensive. To Great Britain, from the dismal December day when Mr. Seward, after conniving at the bluster about the Trent, kissed the rod and surrendered Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason,—through the continuity of humiliations—the Gilchrist *nolle prosequi*—the Slave trade treaty—the Bermuda—the Sunbeam, (it may be the Peterhoff,) and the facts revealed in these Parliamentary papers, it has been—until very lately—to use a mild term—obsequious in the extreme.

And the fruit of all this! What is it? Is it security? Is it confidence that foreign intervention or the danger of a foreign war has been averted. Far—very far from it. Either may come at any instant. As a desperate resort, war may be provoked to save the abolition party. It looks very much as if it would be. Every hour that slips by, without voluntary pacification, makes our condition worse. We are feebler now than we were when Mr. Seward put his signature to the despatch giving up the Trent prisoners. Trust in our rulers is weakened. Our resources in money and men are less. Mr. Chase is rapidly "continentalising" our currency. Conscription is the fierce order of the day. There are more than two hundred thousand poor fellows sleeping in their bloody graves, or wandering, crippled and mutilated, through the wards of our Hospitals, who, then, were alive and well, and healthy and strong, and willing to fight. And all this is the bitter fruit of Mr. Lincoln's home policy and Mr. Seward's diplomacy.

Is there any remedy, or redress? Let the page of our ancient history answer the question, for surely there is no treason in the echo of a voice which spoke words of warning long ago. Just eighty-six years have rolled by since a soldier of the Revolution,—of high renown and unquestioned patriotism,—under circumstances closely resembling those of our day of alarm and sorrow—thus wrote to a friend in Great Britain :

“The dismemberment of the Empire, the loss of commerce and power and consequence among nations, with the downfall of public credit, are but the beginning of those evils which must be followed by a thousand more, unless timely prevented by some lenient hand—some great State physician—aided and supported by men as independent in their fortunes as unsullied in their honour, who have never yet bowed their heads to Baal. Such a man, so supported, may yet save the sinking State by confirming that independence which this people are resolved to part with only when they leave the world. Such a man will do what all wise statesmen have done before him. He will be true to the welfare and interest of his country—and he will endeavour to preserve so much of the empire in prosperity and honour as the circumstances of the times and the mal-administration of those who ruled before him, have left this Government. The States of America are willing to be the friends but will never submit to be the slaves of the parent country. They are by consanguinity, by commerce, by language, and by the affection which naturally springs from them, more attached to you than any other country under the sun. Therefore, spurn not the blessing which yet remains. Instantly withdraw your fleets and armies. Cultivate the friendship and commerce of America. Thus and thus only can you hope to be great and happy. Seek this in a commercial alliance—seek it ere it be too late, for there only must you expect to find it. These are the undisguised sentiments of a man who rejoices not in bloodshed in this fatal contest.”*


These were momentous words, and they made their impression, not on Ministers and Administration men, but on the wise and great men of England—Burke and Fox and Rockingham and Richmond and Conway—that small minority—fewer than we are now. They saw the inevitable future clearly, and thought it the part of wisdom and statesmanship voluntarily to say so, and not to be forced or shamed into it by the action of other nations. The time however had not come. Pharaoh’s heart was still hard. National pride was tenacious and resentful. A flash of eloquence from a decrepit and dying


* General Gates to Earl Thanet, Oct. 1777.

statesman, who, in his heart detested the war, arrested the counsels of moderation and stimulated the passion and fanaticism of the day; and a Stranger did recognize first—created for itself a sympathy on this side of the Atlantic, which yet exists—and the war went on for four years more, of blood, and sorrow, and shame, and debt, and at last Great Britain did, in 1782, what she could have better done in 1778.

PHILADELPHIA,

APRIL 10th, 1863.





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